Public Policy and Homelessness: The Case of Calgary

Public Policy and Homelessness: The Case of Calgary

by | Feb 21, 2017 | Alberta, Big City Charter, Chidom Otogwu, Determinants of Homelessness, Ending Homelessness, Housing, Poverty, Poverty Reduction, Ron Kneebone, Social Housing

Public Policy and Homelessness: The Case of Calgary

On January 24, I gave a presentation to students at the University of Calgary as part of the Certificate in Working with Homeless Populations program. The goal of this presentation was to convey the fact that public policy strongly impacts the number of homeless people in a given jurisdiction at any particular time.

A version of my PowerPoint slides, which are chock-full of visuals and references, can be downloaded here: Falvo Public Policy and Homelessness WHP 1 of 3 

This is Part 1 of a 3-part presentation I gave that day. A blog post based on Part 2 can be found here, while a blog post based on Part 3 can be found here.

Here are 10 things to know:

1. Federal spending in Canada fell drastically from the early 1990s until the mid-2000s. In the early 1990s, federal spending (not counting intergovernmental transfers) represented 19% of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP). By the late-2000s, that figure had dropped to about 13%. That’s a remarkably sharp drop in such a short time.

2. Taxation fell sharply in Canada between the mid-1990s and the late-2000s. Looking at annual tax revenue expressed as a percentage of GDP (all orders of government combined) tax revenue in Canada represented 36% of GDP in the late-1990s.  By 2012, that figure had dropped to below 31%. What’s more, Canada’s level of taxation was considerably above the average for OECD countries in the mid-1990s; today, our taxation level is well below the OECD average.

3. Federal spending on housing decreased substantially beginning in the early 1990s. In light of the trends discussed in points #1 and #2 above, this comes as little surprise to most people. For more on the federal role in housing policy, including a look at how it has evolved over the past several decades, see this 2013 conference paper.

4. Rental housing production in Canada fell sharply beginning in the late 1970s. This happened in part due to reductions in public spending on housing discussed in point #3 above. Other factors that likely led to this drop include high interest rates (which made it expensive for developers to finance new supply), a shrinking middle class (which resulted in less demand for rental units), provincial legislation pertaining to condominiums, and rent regulation.[1]

5. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Alberta government began spending substantially less on housing.This decrease was drastic. Indeed, in 1995, the Alberta government devoted an amount worth 0.36% of its GDP to housing; just five years later, this amount had shrunk to a mere 0.10%. The Alberta government’s annual spending on housing didn’t start to increase again until the early 2000s.

6. In 1993, the Alberta government introduced strict reforms to social assistance. This entailed at least two things.  First, the rules changed, meaning that provincial officials made it much more difficult for Albertans to qualify for social assistance. Second, the annual value of benefit levels for those who did qualify for social assistance dropped quite suddenly (and then continued to erode over time).  Indeed, a ‘single employable adult’ without dependents received almost $9,000 annually in 1992 (that figure includes tax credits); by 2007, this figure had shrunk to less than $6,000[2]  That’s a very sharp loss in annual income for a very low-income individual.

7. Alberta has much less rental housing than other provinces, and this gap has grown in the past 25 years. In 1990, Alberta had almost as many apartment rental units (on a per capita basis) as the rest of Canada.  Then, beginning in the early 1990s, the amount of apartment rentals in Alberta started to decrease; today, Alberta has just half the number of apartment rental units (per capita) as the rest of Canada.  There are three main reasons for this: the first being, historically, Alberta experienced higher rates of in-migration than other provinces; secondly, the Alberta government was not as keen as other provinces to subsidize housing for lower-income households; and lastly, Alberta has a relatively large number of high-income households (and higher-income households typically prefer to own than rent).

8. Calgary has much less rental housing than Edmonton, and this gap has grown since the mid-1990s. Beginning in the early 1990s, the number of rental housing units (per capita) in both Edmonton and Calgary started to drop each year; and it dropped more sharply in Calgary than in Edmonton. Today, Calgary has approximately half the number of rental units as Edmonton on a per-capita basis.

9. The many public policy factors raised above helped create the ‘perfect storm’ for a very sharp rise in homelessness in Calgary beginning in the mid-1990s. From the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s, homelessness in Calgary saw very rapid growth.  For example, according to analysis done with Point-in-Time Count methodology, it grew by almost 700% (per capita) during that time. And while it’s always hard for researchers to establish causation (see point #2 of this blog post) it can reasonably be inferred that the public policy changes discussed above played a major role in this increase.

Part1, Slide 19

10. In 2008, Calgary became the first Canadian city to develop a plan to ‘end homelessness’; since that time, homelessness in Calgary has decreased. There are three main reasons for that decrease. First, since 2008, a great deal of progress has been made at the community level in Calgary (I’ve previously discussed the very important role played by the Calgary Homeless Foundation as System Planner here). Second, benefit levels for Alberta social assistance recipients have increased since 2008.  For example, total annual income received by a ‘single employable’ household receiving social assistance jumped by more than 30% in 2009; and total annual income for a single adult receiving Assured Income for the Severely Handicapped increased by 30% between 2011 and 2013. Third, Calgary’s rental vacancy rate is very high right now (an indirect result of the drop in the price of oil).

In Sum: The intended ‘take away’ from the presentation is that, homelessness is a complex issue that requires a coordinated and collective response that addresses the local issues through local responses. When it comes to ending homelessness, a community plan that is focused on increasing coordination and collaboration across a system of care and greater integration with big system public service providers is vital. For agencies at the frontline, having a System Planner, such as the Calgary Homeless Foundation, providing the big picture view and coordination matters a great deal… and so too does public policy.

I wish to thank: Rachel Campbell, Louise Gallagher, Ron Kneebone, Kara Layher, Lindsay Lenny, Chidom Otogwu, Steve Pomeroy, Joel Sinclair, John Stapleton, Greg Suttor, Alina Turner and Donna Wood for assistance with this.  Any errors are mine.

[1] This is not to suggest that rent regulation doesn’t play an important role in regulating landlord-tenant relations.  For more on this, see this recent analysis.

[2] Both figures in this paragraph are expressed in 2015 constant dollars.

For a PDF version of the present blog post, please click here: Public Policy and Homelessness,The Case of Calgary

Ten things to know about Canadian attempts to count homelessness through Point-in-Time Counts

Ten things to know about Canadian attempts to count homelessness through Point-in-Time Counts

by | Nov 30, 2016 | Pit Count, Point in time Count, Stats Canada

Ten things to know about Canadian attempts to count homelessness through Point-in-Time Counts

Alberta’s seven largest municipalities recently released early results of a provincially-coordinated effort to enumerate and survey persons experiencing homelessness. Most of these communities reported reductions in homelessness, and reported a 19% reduction in province-wide homelessness compared to the first provincially-coordinated count conducted in 2014. The stated purpose of a Point-in-Time Count (PIT Count) is to provide a current snapshot of the demographics and number of people experiencing homelessness within a specific timeframe. Across Canada, these types of exercises have been going on for years—but they’re not always what they seem. Here are 10 things to know.
  1. Local officials already keep basic information about persons sleeping in emergency shelters and other provisional housing; but they typically have very little information about persons sleeping outside. Across Canada, most urban centres keep administrative data on persons experiencing homelessness. Indeed, local officials (often municipal government staff) keep tabs on how many people are sleeping in their emergency shelters; officials also typically know some demographic information about those persons. From time to time, communities also conduct Point in Time (PIT) Counts (i.e. ‘PIT Counts’) which seek not only to survey and count persons sleeping in emergency shelters, but also to survey and count persons sleeping outside. The recently-conducted 7 Cities PIT Count in Alberta PIT gathered data and survey information from emergency shelters, short-term and interim housing, corrections facilities, and persons outside.
  2. For more than a decade, there have been communities in Canada conducting counts of homelessness in their community (i.e. ‘PIT Counts’). Each community has used its own methodological approach, and that methodological approach often changes from year to year, all of which can impact or skew a count. According to a guide prepared by Employment and Social Development Canada: “Differences include the time of year the count is conducted, the time of day the count happens, the people that are included as ‘homeless,’ and the questions that are asked in the survey.” Other factors that can skew the result of a count include weather conditions on the night of the count and changes in the locations within a city where people experiencing homelessness are known to sleep without interference from law enforcement. Unlike data on people experiencing homelessness kept on a day-to-day basis by social workers and other front-line professionals (which I’ve previously blogged about here), data gathered through PIT Counts typically include a strong focus on rough sleepers (i.e. persons sleeping outside on the night of the count).
  3. In 2016, there was a national effort to coordinate PIT Counts across Canada. During this effort, 31 communities participated, spanning seven provinces and one territory. Each of these communities did their counts between January 1 and April 30. For many communities, this was the first time they’d done a PIT Count. Everyone used the same group of core questions. Training workshops were held in November 2015 and in early 2016. A module was created by Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC), and the Canadian Observatory on Homelessness created a toolkit. The report with findings from the 2016 national effort will likely be released by ESDC in the near future.
  4. Canada’s most populous cities chose not to participate in the 2016 nationally-coordinated effort. One reason some cities chose not to participate in the nationally-coordinated effort was that the time of year chosen was not ideal for them. It’s hard for some communities to find volunteers when it’s cold outside. And although communities counting as late as April were ultimately included in the national effort, the original time frame chosen by the federal government was in the dead of winter. Another reason many cities chose not to participate is that counting homeless persons when it’s extremely cold outside runs the risk of under-counting rough sleepers. Finally, some cities had done their previous count just a short period earlier, so an early-2016 count would not have been practical. Cities choosing not to participate in the nationally-coordinated effort include: Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Ottawa and Winnipeg. (As mentioned above, however, at the provincial level Alberta’s seven major cities did participate in Canada’s first provincially-coordinated PIT Count in October of 2014 with a commitment to count again in October of 2016.)
  5. PIT Counts combine research and advocacy—and that can be messy. Researchers and policy-makers find it helpful to have accurate data about homeless populations. However, local officials wanting to demonstrate progress in “ending homelessness” sometimes see the results of PIT Counts as ‘progress reports.’ This can create a tension between those wanting accuracy, on the one hand, with those wanting to present an ongoing picture of progress to all stakeholders. Some local officials responsible for undertaking PIT Counts are therefore in a conflict of interest situation. (Remember: local communities decide what kind of methodology to use and how to change their methodology from one year to the next. Communities intent on demonstrating progress in “ending homelessness” may find it tempting to adjust methodologies to create opportunities to present a lower ‘final number’ than previously announced…)
  6. Officials in some communities may (quietly) hope they end up with a smaller ‘count size;’ officials in other communities may (quietly) hope to end up with a larger ‘count size.’ Admittedly, not every community takes the same approach to advocacy. While many want to ‘show progress’ by ending up with a smaller number of individuals enumerated, others may want to end up with a larger number (in order to show funders that further resources are needed in order to end homelessness). This may depend on whether local officials choose a ‘glass half full’ approach to advocacy or a ‘glass half empty’ approach. (I discuss both of these approaches in this previous blog post.)
  7. One challenge with PIT Counts is the need to balance methodological consistency and rigour, on the one hand, with community flexibility and need, on the other. As I’ll discuss in point #9 below, Statistics Canada could potentially be resourced to assist with future PIT Counts; this might result in more methodological consistency across years and across jurisdictions. However, many Canadian cities have an established methodology that works for their community that has been developed over many years. This allows for year over year comparisons within the community but limited comparisons across jurisdictions. As well, these communities often have a very well-organized network of volunteers who support their endeavours and use the PIT Count as an opportunity to raise awareness of homelessness in the community through media engagement and opportunities to involve political leadership in the count.
  8. I think an unresolved methodological question with PIT Counts is whether the outdoor (i.e. rough sleeper) component of a community’s PIT Count results should be interpreted as being representative of that community’s outdoor homeless population.In other words, if 20% of homeless persons enumerated outside in Toronto’s PIT Count are over the age of 65, is it reasonable to infer from this that 20% of Toronto’s actual outdoor homeless population is also over the age of 65? I think most people who read results of PIT Counts have a tendency to assume that the results for most cities are representative; but careful researchers will acknowledge that this may not always be the case. I think the more confident enumerators are that most regions of their city with rough sleepers have been covered in a PIT Count, the more reasonable it is to infer that that city’s PIT Count results are indeed representative of that city’s actual homeless population.
  9. The federal government could add methodological rigour to PIT Counts by asking Statistics Canada to assist with a federally-coordinated PIT Count effort. Indeed, ESDC could fund Statistics Canada to develop a methodology and train volunteers to conduct a survey that would seek to be representative of each community’s homeless population. Under this scenario, volunteers trained by Statistics Canada officials would conduct face-to-face interviews with persons experiencing homelessness. This survey could be done yearly and, once complete, an aggregation of the data collected could be made available at the CANSIM web site. A key advantage of Statistics Canada being involved is that survey design and administration is their area of expertise. Under this approach, there would be one common methodology used to collect data across Canada (rather than several dozen, as is currently the case) and this would allow for comparisons across jurisdictions and across time. This could also help address the potential conflict of interest situation discussed in point #5 above—indeed, Statistics Canada officials would ensure (if not require) methodological consistency across communities.
  10. There are several advantages to the status quo approach. In addition to the advantages mentioned in point #7 above (pertaining to volunteer recruitment), another advantage of the status quo approach is community control. Indeed, under the existing system (whereby each community conducts its own count) if local organizers want to add new questions or rephrase existing ones, they can do so at their own discretion.
Going forward. In 2018, the federal government will once again attempt a nationally-coordinated PiT Count. Participating communities will be asked to conduct their counts in either March or April that year. Each participating community will also receive funding from ESDC to use toward the effort. More information on the “second Canadian coordinated homeless count” can be found here. To download a PDF version of this document click HERE. ______________________________________________________

The following persons provided invaluable assistance in the preparation of this blog post: Robbie Brydon, Rachel Campbell, Wally Czech, Jesse Donaldson, Louise Gallagher, Darcy Halber, Patrick Hunter, Nicole Jackson, Ali Jadidzadeh, Lindsay Lenny, Kevin McNichol, Adam Melnyk, Tim Richter, John Rowland and Munir Sheikh. The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author, and not necessarily those of the Calgary Homeless Foundation. Any errors lie with the author.

Ten Things to Know About Federal Income Support for Low-Income Seniors in Canada

Ten Things to Know About Federal Income Support for Low-Income Seniors in Canada

by | Aug 25, 2016 | Income Inequality, Poverty

Ten Things to Know About Federal Income Support for Low-Income Seniors in Canada

Prepared by Allan Moscovitch, Professor, Carleton University; Nick Falvo, Director of Research & Data at the Calgary Housing Foundation; and David Macdonald, Senior Economist at the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives

In the latest edition of How Ottawa Spends, we have a chapter titled “The Federal Government and Old Age Security:  Then, Now, and the Future.” The focus of our chapter was the potential impact of the Harper government’s decision to move the age of eligibility for Old Age Security (OAS) benefits from 65 to 67.

This change had been announced by the Harper government in the 2012 federal budget; it was to start to take effect in 2023. The Trudeau Liberals promised in their recent election platform to notgo ahead with the change; and after the election they did announce they would return the age of qualification for the OAS back to 65.

A recent report by Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Office has resulted in some debate as to the wisdom of the Trudeau government changing the age of eligibility for OAS from 67 back to 65.

With all of this in mind, here are 10 things to know about federal income support for seniors in Canada:

  1. The first income-support program for low-income seniors in Canada was called the Old Age Pension. This program took effect in 1927, when the Old Age Pensions Act was passed. Labour unrest after World War I had helped bring this about; there were general strikes all over Canada (including the Winnipeg General Strike in 1919 and a bitter strike in Cape Breton in 1925).  Initially, the federal government would cost-share (50:50) this means-tested pension plan with those provincial governments which chose to participate.   A few years later, this changed to a 75:25 fed-prov split to induce more provinces to join.  From the outset, the program was administered by provincial governments.
  2. Over time, income support for seniors became more generous. When the 1927 legislation was passed, an individual had to be 70 years of age or older in order to qualify. The individual also had to have an assessed annual income of less than $5,120 (in 2015 dollars) at the time of receipt.   The maximum pension a single person could receive was $3,370/yr (in 2015 dollars).  Beginning in 1947, the maximum annual pension that a single person could receive, in 2015 dollars, was $9,200.
  3. Initially, Indians[1] who had status under the Indian Act were explicitly excluded from receiving a pension under the 1927 legislation. The attitude of the federal government at the time was the Indigenous peoples should leave the reserve and stop being Aboriginal. If they left the reserve, they could qualify for an Old Age Pension.  To do that, they had to renounce their Aboriginal status and become a British subject (Canadian citizenship didn’t exist until 1947).
  4. In 1951, major changes were made to this program and it became known as Old Age Security (OAS). In 1951, the Old Age Security Act and the Old Age Assistance Act were both passed, providing the legislative basis for a new pension program that came into being in 1952. The former provided for a pension at age 70 while the latter provided for a pension for people 65 to 69 and in need.  In 1952, the provinces agreed to a constitutional amendment that permitted the federal government to administer the program.  This entire program was financed 100% federally; there would now be no provincial money involved.
  5. With the 1951 changes, members of First Nations were now eligible for benefits. This reflected changes in attitudes after World War II; the public began to realize that returning Indigenous war veterans were not eligible for social welfare benefits that were available to the rest of Canada’s population.
  6. In the mid-1960s, major changes were made to the OAS. Beginning in 1965, the OAS would now be one program for people over the age of 65. By this time, the system included a supplement, cost shared 50:50 with the provinces, that would be available to some seniors between the ages of 65 and 69.  In 1966, the OAS was made available (universally) to anyone 65 and older.  This had the effect of setting a standard for the age of retirement in Canada.
  7. Today’s OAS system serves 5.5 million Canadians; its current annual cost is $35 billion, or about 13% of total spending by Canada’s federal government. As of May 2015, the full OAS was $6,800/yr. That full amount is available to Canadians with annual incomes below $71,592.  Today, low-income seniors who received the OAS can also apply for the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS).  The maximum GIS benefit for a single adult is $766/month, or $9,200/year.  In the case of GIS recipients who continue to work, the GIS is ‘clawed back’ at the rate of 50 cents for every dollar of income.   About 1.8 million Canadians receive the GIS today.  This costs Canada’s federal government  almost $11 billion/yr.
  8. With the OAS/GIS system in place, there is substantially less poverty among seniors than there would be if the system were not in place. Using the after-tax Low Income Measure (LIM), an individual or household is ‘in poverty’ if their income is less than 50% of the median income. In 1976, almost 23% of seniors households fell below the LIM; by 1996, this number had declined to a mere 3%.  OAS and GIS are almost certainly responsible for much of this decline.The Canada Pension Plan (CPP)/Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) is also having the effect of lowering the poverty rate for seniors. Once Canadians reach the age of 65 and receive income from OAS, GIS and/or CPP their poverty rate (as measured by the LIM) drops very substantially.  For example, 37% of single females aged 64 in Canada live in poverty; among 65 year-old single females, the rate is just 21%.
  9. Since 2003, the percentage of elderly Canadians in poverty, as measured by the LIM, has risen back up to almost 10%. That’s largely because the LIM is set at 50% of median income adjusted for family size; and since 2003, the median incomes of Canadians have increased in real terms. Meanwhile, lower income seniors rely mostly on OAS/GIS and the CPP/QPP.  OAS/GIS is indexed to the Consumer Prince Index (CPI) only (i.e. not to wages and not median income).  The CPP/QPP you get in the year you retire is tied to average wages; but after you retire, your CPP/QPP increases by CPI only…so you fall relative to median incomes of the general population.
  10. Our chapter argues that, if the change in OAS eligibility were to happen, the percentage of Canadians aged 65 and 66 living in poverty would increase substantially. We made these calculations with the help of Statistics Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (note: David Macdonald is a whiz at this!).  Many of those aged 65 and 66 not getting OAS/GIS would likely continue receiving social assistancebenefits; and social assistance benefits are not as generous as the combination of OAS/GIS benefits.  For example, a single senior with no other income currently has access to just over $17,000 annually from OAS and GIS; but as a social assistance recipient, the same person would receive between $7,000 and $11,000 per year (depending on the province)—or $6,000 and $16,000 in the territories.  What’s more, social assistance is funded by provincial governments, meaning that the proposed changed would offload spending from the federal government onto provincial governments.

Frances Abele and Richard Shillington have been very helpful in the preparation of this blog post.  Any errors are our own.

[1] The term “First Nation” was not used until relatively recently.

Ten things to know about central agencies in Canada

Ten things to know about central agencies in Canada

by | Aug 8, 2016 | Government Funding, Pitching new programs to government, Research and Data

Ten things to know about central agencies in Canada

From time to time, voluntary sector leaders—and advocates in general—come up with ideas for new spending and new social programs.  When they do this, they often focus too much on influencing elected officials, and too little on influencing senior public servants.  What’s more, it’s important that their proposals be supported by good research, in part because exaggerated claims about the benefits of their proposals may hurt them in the end.  With all of this in mind, here are 10 things to know about central agencies in Canada.

  1.  Even after a minister tells you they support your idea, there will often be further government approvals required.[1] At the federal level, this process is run by three central agencies; they are Privy Council Office (PCO), Finance Canada and Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS). Their respective roles will be discussed below. There are broadly similar functions for provincial and territorial governments (but details may vary).      
  2.  For your idea to become a new program, cabinet will need to give “policy authority” and PCO supports this cabinet decision-making process. PCO coordinates the meetings of cabinet and cabinet committees, provides advice to the prime minister on cabinet business and briefs the chair of committees on agenda items. During this process, PCO analysts play a “challenge function role” (this will be a recurring theme), meaning they critically assess and examine proposals as they come forward. Questions that might get asked by PCO officials in Ottawa include: Is this an area of federal jurisdiction?  Does this initiative have intergovernmental implications?  Have you consulted on this with other departments within the federal government? (If no such consultation has taken place, PCO officials will coordinate a meeting among staff from various federal departments.)  PCO officials might call into question the rationale or evidence used to support the proposal and if a similar program exists elsewhere, PCO officials will point this out.  PCO will also ensure that the political implications are spelled out.       
  3.  Once you have policy authority from cabinet, a new program will still need budgetary approval through Finance if it involves new money. Finance provides funding authority or a “source of funds” for new proposals through the budget process. Departments and Ministers generally make a request to the Minister of Finance and it gets assessed by public servants in the Department of Finance, who also play a challenge function. The underlying question asked by Finance officials is “Does this initiative really require new money?” My sources in Ottawa have three unofficial mottos that Finance officials can almost always be expected to say.  The first is “How much will that cost?” The second is “Why can’t you do that from your existing budgetary allotment?” And the third is “No” (hopefully, the last one is not so consistent).  It’s also important to note that the budget process doesn’t just assess the merit of spending money on your idea on a yes-or-no basis, but also the comparative merit of different proposals. You’re competing against other ideas for scarce resources.  Finance officials are suspicious of lofty promises that a proposal will save large sums of money somewhere else; they hear this often.  If the proposal has the potential to save money elsewhere, be prepared to demonstrate this with precision and nuance.    
  4.  Treasury Board, a committee of cabinet, provides implementation authority for proposals and this approval process gets into the details of how the program will be run. Cabinet policy authority is sometimes thought of as “agreement in principle”, while Treasury Board is where the details get discussed. TBS officials play a challenge function that is focused on how the proposal will be implemented rather than challenging the basic idea. They will want to know the risks inherent in the proposed initiative and how they are addressed. They’ll also want to know if the proposal is compliant with other federal policies and they’ll want to know if the details of the proposal are logistically sound and realistic.  For example, if a complex program is proposed with a plan for three staff persons to run it, TBS officials will call this into question.  In Ottawa these days, treasury board officials are also very focused on the measurement of outcomes.    
  5.  There is typically some overlap between what the different central agencies do. For example, in Ottawa, PCO officials might ask how results for a new program might be measured (even though that’s more typically thought of as a question asked by TBS officials). Likewise, PCO officials might also scrutinize a cost-benefit analysis that is supporting a pitch (even though similar scrutiny might be provided by finance officials). And the central agencies work closely together.    
  6.  At the end of the day, if cabinet really wants a new program or new spending, central agencies won’t stop the initiative. An inherent principle underlying representative, executive government is that ministers are ultimately the decision-makers. Public servants, meanwhile, operate with the principle of “fearless advice, faithful implementation.”    
  7.   In Ottawa, even the Minister typically has to wait until Budget Day to know if each proposal has been accepted. That’s because the final decision on every budget item is made between the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister, and their decision is usually kept secret—even from the rest of cabinet—until the budget is released. (In Ottawa, proposals for a new program or new spending are typically made months before.)     
  8.  A key take-away from all of this is that, when voluntary sector organizations advocate for a new program or new spending, they should think about both elected officials and senior public servants. Indeed, it’s important to engage senior public servants early and often. If an elected official likes your proposal, do not assume that members of the senior public service won’t eventually give it the third degree.  Ideally, as many senior public servants as possible should hear about your proposal directly from your organization before it arrives to them via official channels.     
  9.  New proposals should be supported by sound research. Just because an elected official doesn’t scrutinize your cost-benefit analysis or your long-term savings calculations, doesn’t mean senior public servants won’t. Staff in both central agencies and line departments will appreciate intellectually honest analysis, the humble presentation of information and well-referenced propositions. The challenge function at the central agencies will involve dozens of very smart people reviewing and assessing the proposal; your proposal (sponsored by the department and minister) will stand up much better if it has a strong problem definition (a.k.a. the rationale for why action is needed) and recommendations supported by evidence.    
  10.  Exaggerated claims about your proposal will probably burn you in the end. Consider a statement such as: “This proposed program will revolutionize this sector because nothing this great has ever been done before.” That might get you traction in the media and with some elected officials; but always consider the roles of central agencies discussed above. Senior public servants have heard such statements before and will likely scrutinize every aspect of such a claim.

 The author wishes to thank Francesco Falvo, Louise Gallagher, Darcy Halber, Kayle Hatt, Alex Himelfarb, Kevin McNichol, Michael Mendelson, Leslie Pal, John Stapleton, Katherine White and one anonymous reviewer for invaluable assistance with this.  Any errors are his.

[1] An important exception is in the case where your idea happens to be within the minister’s existing authority and, more importantly, within the existing department/ministry budget and not especially politically contentious.

Using Data to End Homelessness in Calgary

Using Data to End Homelessness in Calgary

by | Apr 8, 2016 | Uncategorized

Using Data to End Homelessness in Calgary

On March 9, I spoke on a panel in Professor Susan Phillips’ Policy and Program Evaluation course at Carleton University.  This is a required course in Carleton’s Master of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Leadership program, and one of the program’s main themes is that non-profit organizations face strong expectations to demonstrate their effectiveness.  Thus, future leaders in the sector will need to be both knowledgeable and competent in this regard.

I was asked to speak to the above theme from the vantage point of my role as Director of Research & Data at the Calgary Homeless Foundation (CHF).  With this in mind, here are 10 things future non-profit leaders should know.

  1. In 2008, Calgary became the first city in Canada to launch a plan to “end homelessness.” Calgary’s plan was based on a model used in more than 300 communities in the United States. Today, more than one dozen Canadian cities have such a plan. Also since 2008, on a per capita basis, homelessness (as measured by Point-in-Time counts) has decreased in Calgary by 17%.
  2. Calgary’s Homelessness Management Information System (HMIS) may be the most sophisticated of its kind in Canada. When Calgary developed its plan, it decided to also develop an information management system that, among other things, could help it track progress. Indeed, last fall, I wrote that many of Calgary’s homeless-serving organizations enter client information into a database called HMIS.  Today, all Calgary non-profit programs that receive funding from the CHF must use the HMIS (it’s stipulated in their contracts); and some non-funded agencies voluntarily use the HMIS system for some of their programs.
  3. The development and implementation of Calgary’s HMIS system has been guided by several community committees. For several years, an HMIS Advisory Committee met to test the ‘big brother’ concern about the system. The Committee consisted of both staff from homeless-serving agencies and clients from the sector. Along with addressing privacy concerns, clients were part of the decision-making process (and were assured that the police would not have access to client records). There was also (and still is) an HMIS User Group attended by staff who use the HMIS system—that group meets on an ad hoc basis to discuss more technical matters, such as updates to the database system, reporting cycles and ‘how to’ matters (it met more frequently in the early days of the system than it does today).  Finally, now that the system has been ‘up and running’ for some time, the CHF still convenes smaller committees on an ad hoc basis to help guide specific initiatives.
  4. An important success of Calgary’s HMIS system has been its assistance with program referrals. Many (but not all) homeless persons in Calgary go through an intake process with the help of the Service Prioritization Decision Assessment Tool (SPDAT). The SPDAT gives the client an acuity score, which assists with their placement into CHF-funded housing programs (information gathered during the SPDAT process is entered into the HMIS system).  Based on the goals set out in Calgary’s Plan to End Homelessness, clients with higher SPDAT scores are often given higher priority for placement into CHF-funded housing.  Committees meet on a regular basis to recommend which clients be placed into the limited amount of subsidized housing available.[1] The formal name for this entire process is called Coordinated Access & Assessment (CAA). (For more on Calgary’s CAA system, see this recent book chapter by Jerilyn Dressler.)
  5. Some non-profit organizations have been happy to share their data with CHF; others less so. In my experience, before a non-profit shares data voluntarily with CHF, they like to know what exactly the data will be used for and how they may benefit from sharing their data. Until they see how the sharing of data can benefit their organization and its clientele, they’re reluctant to share (unless they’re mandated to do so by their funder).  Organizations such as the CHF need to therefore work hard to build trust with other non-profits and demonstrate how data sharing can be mutually beneficial, rather than simply thinking of receiving data as an entitlement.
  6. CHF disburses funding to Calgary-based non-profits in the homeless-serving sector each year; to monitor their outcomes and impact, it benchmarks them against key performance indicators (KPIs). Different programs have different objectives—for example, KPIs developed for some programs put emphasis on how effective those programs appear to be in creating stable housing situations for their tenants. CHF staff, in monitoring each funded agency’s progress on KPIs, is able to track progress thanks to the aforementioned HMIS database system.  CHF then makes annual funding decisions based in part on each funded program’s performance against KPIs. 
  7. Calgary’s HMIS system provides invaluable support to the aforementioned benchmarking system. Indeed, this has been one of the major successes of Calgary’s HMIS system. It’s through the HMIS system that ‘program performance’ data is gathered from CHF-funded programs.
  8. One drawback of HMIS data is that most of its client data is based on self-reporting. However, it should be noted that self-reported information is gathered by an experienced case manager during an in-person interview.  What’s more, many well-respected data sources in Canada are also based on self-reporting; these include the Labour Force Survey and the Census.In future, CHF researchers would like to cross-reference self-reported HMIS data with administrative data from health systems and justice systems, in order to compare information on the same individual. (Such a research exercise would obviously require client consent, as well as cooperation from health and justice authorities.) 
  9. I think the main success of Calgary’s initial Plan to End Homelessness was that it helped galvanize public attention and stopped homelessness from rising. When the original Plan was developed in 2008, Calgary had experienced a 650% increase in homelessness over just a 10-year period. And as indicated above, Calgary has since seen a 17% drop in per-capita homelessness since the original Plan was unveiled.  I personally consider that to be a very impressive accomplishment; indeed, there is little doubt in my mind that there are people alive today thanks largely to that Plan.  In retrospect, eliminating homelessness by 2018 (a key goal of he original plan) was a very ambitious target.
  10. My main piece of advice to third-sector (i.e. non-profit) leaders is to be humble with data. By that, I mean they shouldn’t try to ‘over interpret’ data.  Non-profit leaders need to be honest about the limitations of both their data and the statistical analysis they undertake using that data.  They should also be forthright about assumptions they make in long-term projections.  When in doubt, they should seek guidance from more senior researchers.  Though it may be tempting to exaggerate one’s knowledge and foresight at times, remember that chickens eventually come home to roost.  And with that in mind, I’ll remind blog readers what the late John Kenneth Galbraith once said about economic forecasters: “There are two kinds of forecasters: those who don’t know, and those who don’t know they don’t know.”

[1] Even with Calgary’s sophisticated use of data, the city still has far more homeless people in need of housing than it has subsidized housing units available.  Thus, due to a lack of affordable housing, some people experiencing homelessness can wait years to be placed into housing; others die while on the waiting list.  That’s a big reason why the CHF endorses this recent policy statement and continues to lobby all levels of government for more funding.

Nick Falvo is Director of Research and Data at the Calgary Homeless Foundation. His area of research is social policy, with a focus on poverty, housing, homelessness and social assistance. Nick has a PhD in public policy from Carleton University. Fluently bilingual, he is a member of the editorial board of the Canadian Review of Social Policy / Revue canadienne de politique sociale.  Contact him at nick@calgaryhomeless.com. Follow him on Twitter: @nicholas_falvo.

Version française: L’ Utilisation de données dans le programme visant à mettre fin à l’itinérance à Calgary

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The following individuals were very helpful in the preparation of this blog post:  Britany Ardelli, Janice Chan, Francesco Falvo, Louise Gallagher, Darcy Halber, Chantal Hansen, Ron Kneebone, Ali Jadidzadeh, Jennifer Legate, Kevin McNichol, Natalie Noble, John Rowland and Kelsey Shea.  Any errors are mine.