Supporting Indigenous residents at Horizon Housing

Supporting Indigenous residents at Horizon Housing

Supporting Indigenous residents at Horizon Housing

La version française de ce billet se trouve ici.

Horizon Housing is a non-profit affordable housing provider in Calgary that works in partnership with more than 40 community agencies that refer residents and provide ongoing social supports so residents can maintain stable housing over the long term.

Horizon recently commissioned a report with the view of improving housing outcomes for its Indigenous residents (i.e., residents who are First Nation, Métis or Inuit).

Here are 10 things to know.

1. One of Horizon’s desired outcomes is low rates of negative exits among its residents. A negative exit at Horizon is defined as an exit that happens for reasons other than a resident wishing to move, meaning it is involuntary on the part of the resident.

2. Indigenous residents at Horizon experience a disproportionate number of negative exits. While just over 10% of Horizon’s residents are Indigenous, 44% of Horizon’s negative exits concern Indigenous residents. More than three-quarters of negative exits experienced by Indigenous residents at Horizon involve a tenancy that lasts less than a year.

3. In 2020, Horizon reached out to Nick Falvo Consulting to explore the matter. The following methodological approaches were used: a literature review; interviews with Indigenous residents at Horizon; interviews with subject specialists; and focus groups.

4. An Advisory Committee met monthly to provide guidance to the research project. This committee’s membership consisted of four Indigenous people and two non-Indigenous people. They provided crucial guidance on protocol throughout the project, and reviewed drafts of all documents.

5. The report went through an extensive review process. This included the circulation of a draft version of the report to all research participants and several dozen experts across Canada. It also included four virtual presentations of draft findings, including one specifically for Elders.

6. The final report recommends more on-site cultural programming and access to Elders. A dominant theme raised by Indigenous residents was a desire to have Horizon organize cultural events in partnership with Indigenous-serving organizations. Such activities would be led by Elders.

7. It also recommends more opportunities to smudge. Several Indigenous residents expressed a strong desire to smudge, but were not sure whether they were allowed to smudge in their units, and were concerned that doing so might trigger smoke alarms or other concerns.

8. The report proposes an enhanced resident orientation process. Currently, resident orientation at Horizon is led by building managers. The report recommends an enhanced orientation that might consist of several stages, whereby incoming residents would feel more welcome and supported.

9. The report recommends that Horizon hire an Indigenous Liaison Person. Other terms for such a position include Indigenous Advisor and Cultural Resource Person. This person could help steward (i.e., ‘project manage’) Horizon’s Indigenous initiatives, track recommendations made in this report, and report on them regularly to meetings of Horizon’s Leadership Team, Horizon’s Board of Directors, and the community at large.

10. The report includes additional recommendations. These consist of: improved staff training; increasing the size of Horizon’s Resident Services Team (which provides front-line assistance to residents); Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (an approach to building design whereby a law enforcement lens is applied to the built environment); the implementation of an eviction prevention initiative (whereby rent could be covered in the case of extenuating circumstances); Indigenous representation on Horizon’s Board of Directors and staff leadership team; and an annual survey specifically for Horizon’s Indigenous residents.

In sum. This report provides specific advice on how Horizon can work to improve housing outcomes for its Indigenous residents. Most of its recommendations are contingent on external funding, and all involve collaboration with Horizon’s partners—both existing partners and new partners. The report’s findings and recommendations may also be helpful to other housing providers across Canada.

Supporting Indigenous residents at Horizon Housing

Appuyer les résidents autochtones chez Horizon Housing

Appuyer les résidents autochtones chez Horizon Housing

An English-language version of this blog post is available here.

Horizon Housing est un organisme à but non lucratif basé à Calgary qui fournit des services de logement abordable en partenariat avec plus de 40 agences communautaires. Ensemble, ils offrent des services afin de favoriser que leurs résidents demeurent logés.

Récemment, Horizon a commandé un rapport dans le but d’améliorer les perspectives de logement pour ses résidents autochtones (c’est à dire, les résidents issus des Premières Nations, les Métis et les Inuits).

Voici 10 faits saillants tirés du rapport.

1. L’un des résultats souhaités par Horizon est un bas taux de « sorties involontaires » par ses résidents. On entend par cela toute sortie qui a lieu pour des raisons autres que le désir du résident à déménager de son propre gré.

2. Les résidents autochtones chez Horizon font l’objet d’une quantité disproportionnée de sorties involontaires. Bien qu’un peu plus de 10 % des résidents d’Horizon sont autochtones, ils représentent 44 % des sorties involontaires. Plus du trois quarts des sorties involontaires vécues par des résidents autochtones chez Horizon ont lieu au bout d’une résidence de moins d’un an.

3. En 2020, Horizon a demandé à Nick Falvo Consulting de creuser l’enjeu. Les méthodes suivantes ont été suivies : une analyse documentaire; des entrevues avec des résidents autochtones chez Horizon; des entrevues avec des spécialistes; et des groupes cibles.

4. Un comité consultatif s’est rencontré mensuellement pour orienter le projet. Ce comité était composé de quatre personnes autochtones et deux personnes allochtones. Leurs conseils ont été essentiels durant le projet, et ils ont révisé les ébauches de tous les documents qui en sont issus.

5. Le rapport a été scruté à la loupe. Cela a compris la circulation d’une ébauche du rapport auprès de tous les participants, et plusieurs dizaines d’experts à travers le Canada. Quatre présentations d’une ébauche des conclusions ont eu lieu, dont une pour les Aînés.

6. Le rapport recommande plus de programmation culturelle sur le site des résidences, ainsi qu’un accès aux Aînés. L’un des thèmes dominants soulevés par les résidents autochtones était le désir que Horizon organise des événements culturels en partenariat avec des organismes au service des Autochtones. De tels événements seraient dirigés par des Aînés.

7. Le rapport recommande aussi plus d’occasions permettant la pratique de purification par la fumée (smudging). Plusieurs résidents autochtones ont exprimé un fort désir de smudger, mais ne savaient pas s’ils avaient la permission de le faire dans leurs appartements et s’inquiétaient de déclencher l’alarme à feu ou de s’attirer d’autres problèmes.

8. Le rapport propose un processus d’orientation amélioré. Actuellement, l’orientation des résidents est menée par les gestionnaires des édifices. Le rapport recommande une orientation améliorée et en plusieurs étapes, où les nouveaux arrivants se sentiraient plus accueillis et appuyés.

9. Le rapport recommande que Horizon embauche un responsable de la liaison autochtone. D’autres titres possibles pour un tel poste comprennent Aviseur autochtone ou Responsable des ressources culturelles. Cette personne aurait pour mandat d’aider à gérer les initiatives autochtones d’Horizon, tenir compte des recommandations de ce rapport, et d’en faire part à l’équipe de gestion de Horizon, son conseil d’administration, et l’ensemble de la communauté.

10. Ce rapport comprend des recommandations additionnelles. Elles comprennent : l’amélioration de la formation des employés; l’agrandissement de l’équipe des services aux résidents d’Horizon (qui a la responsabilité d’offrir des services de première ligne aux résidents); l’aménagement du lieu selon des principes vérifiés pour réduire le crime; la mise en oeuvre d’une initiative de prévention d’expulsion (par laquelle le loyer serait payé dans des cas exceptionnels); une représentation autochtone sur le conseil d’administration et dans l’équipe de gestion d’Horizon; un sondage annuel pour les résidents autochtones d’Horizon.

En somme, ce rapport fournit des conseils ciblés pour permettre à Horizon d’améliorer les perspectives de logement de ses résidents autochtones. La plupart des recommandations dépendent de financement externe et l’ensemble des recommandations dépendent aussi de la collaboration des partenaires actuels et futurs d’Horizon. Les conclusions du rapport pourraient également être utiles pour d’autres fournisseurs de logement à travers le Canada.

Les effets à long terme de la récession de la COVID-19 sur le sans-abrisme au Canada

Les effets à long terme de la récession de la COVID-19 sur le sans-abrisme au Canada

Les effets à long terme de la récession de la COVID-19 sur le sans-abrisme au Canada

An English-language version of this blog post is available here.

J’ai rédigé un rapport pour Emploi et Développement social Canada qui présente les impacts les plus probables de la récession actuelle sur le sans-abrisme. Le rapport complet est disponible (en  anglais) ici.

Voici 10 choses à savoir à ce sujet.

  1. La récession actuelle risque de contribuer au sans-abrisme au Canada, mais plusieurs facteurs influenceront son ampleur. Parmi ceux-ci : le ressentiment des effets de la récession pourrait prendre jusqu’à cinq ans; les nombreux inconnus à l’horizon (par exemple, de potentielles vagues subséquentes de la pandémie, le développement d’un vaccin, la nature de futures prestations); les variantes démographiques d’une communauté à l’autre (notamment en ce qui concerne le marché du travail et le marché immobilier).
  1. L’effet de décalage de cinq ans s’explique en partie par la lutte pour éviter de perdre leur logement. Lorsque les ménages affronteront une perte de revenu ou d’emploi, ils pourraient tenter de négocier des arriérés de loyer avec le propriétaire de leur domicile; ils pourraient aussi emprunter de l’argent à des amis ou à d’autres membres de leur famille. Ils pourraient tenter d’emménager avec des amis, de la famille, ou dans un logement plus abordable. Le système de bienêtre social canadien a également pour effet de retarder les effets de la récession. Par exemple, les prestations d’assurance emploi (et plus récemment la Prestation d’urgence canadienne) peuvent atténuer les effets d’une perte d’emploi, aidant ainsi les ménages à maintenir leurs logements. Même si elle est moins généreuse, l’assurance sociale peut également contribuer à retarder le sans-abrisme.
  1. L’effet de décalage donne aussi la chance aux paliers gouvernementaux supérieurs de prévoir des initiatives contre le sans-abrisme. Puisqu’il pourrait prendre encore quelques années pour que l’on perçoive la croissance du sans-abrisme dû à la récession actuelle, il y a suffisamment de temps pour concevoir, implanter et observer les retombées de nouvelles mesures préventives. Ces nouvelles mesures pourraient cibler des ménages qui risquent de perdre leur logement, ou qui sont nouvellement sans-abris.[1] 
  1. L’impact de la récession variera d’une communauté à l’autre à travers le pays. L’état des marchés immobiliers, des systèmes d’aide financière, et de la planification du sans-abrisme varie à travers le Canada. De plus, les trajets des sans-abris migrant à travers le pays seront difficiles à prévoir au cours des prochaines années. Conséquemment, il sera difficile de prévoir dans quelles communautés et à quel moment surviendra l’augmentation du sans-abrisme. Nous savons par contre que les personnes les plus affectées par la récession de la COVID-19 sont : les jeunes, les femmes, les personnes célibataires et les personnes sans diplôme d’études secondaires.
  1. Afin de tenir compte des nombreux facteurs en jeu, les fonctionnaires doivent surveiller une variété d’indicateurs. Le rapport recommande à EDSC de tenir compte des indicateurs suivants tout au long de la récession : le taux de chômage officiel, la proportion de Canadiens qui tombent sous la Mesure axée sur les conditions du marché (surtout ceux qui tombent sous le seuil de 75%)[2]; les taux d’aide sociale; le cout médian des loyers; le taux d’inoccupation des loyers; la proportion de ménages qui consacre plus de 50% de leur revenu sur l’habitation; les expulsions; et le taux d’occupation quotidien des refuges d’urgence.
  1. Il faudra faire preuve de nuances avec ces données. Autant que possible, il faudra surveiller l’évolution de ces indicateurs depuis le début de la pandémie, ainsi qu’à travers les différentes régions et groupes démographiques précis (par exemple les femmes, les jeunes, les Autochtones, etc.)
  1. Le rapport recommande au gouvernement fédéral d’améliorer l’Allocation canadienne pour le logement (ACL). Cette prestation offre une aide financière aux foyers à faible revenu afin de payer leur loyer. Il est prévu que la moitié de cet argent proviendra du gouvernement fédéral, et que l’autre moitié proviendra des gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux. L’ACL devait être lancée le 1er avril 2020, cependant, il n’y a que cinq provinces qui ont signé l’entente. Le gouvernement fédéral pourrait augmenter son apport à l’ACL afin d’encourager le restant des provinces et territoires à en faire autant. Par exemple, le gouvernement fédéral pourrait offrir d’assurer les deux tiers ou les trois quarts des couts.
  1. Le rapport recommande également que le gouvernement fédéral fasse preuve de souplesse quant au recouvrement des montants excédentaires de la Prestation canadienne d’urgence (PUC) versés aux prestataires d’aide sociale. Il est nécessaire de souligner ce point vu la confusion considérable entourant le lancement de la PUC. Une telle approche pourrait comprendre un recouvrement partiel chez ces individus (par l’entremise du système d’impôts), et une amnistie totale devrait être considérée dans certains cas. 
  1. Le rapport recommande qu’EDSC mette sur pied une nouvelle source de financement pour le programme Vers un chez-soi (le véhicule principal par lequel le gouvernement fédéral lutte contre le sans-abrisme). Le rapport aborde la réussite d’effets préventifs aux États-Unis à la suite de la récession de 2008-2009, et encourage EDSC à mettre sur pied un programme semblable au Canada. Le programme pourrait mettre de l’avant une aide financière de courte-durée pour les ménages qui sont à risque de perdre leur logement, en train de le perdre, ou qui l’ont perdu récemment. Les cibles pourraient évoluer au fil du temps, à la lumière de changements survenant dans les indicateurs mentionnés précédemment (taux de chômage officiel, proportion des gens avec des revenus inférieurs à la Mesure axée sur les conditions du marché, etc.).
  1. Le rapport propose des changements politiques que pourraient entamer les gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux. Ceux-ci comprennent une augmentation des prestations d’aide sociale, de rétablir l’admissibilité des gens disqualifiés de l’aide sociale à cause de la PUC, et encourager les refuges d’urgence à prioriser les solutions basées sur le logement.

En résumé, puisque nous sommes conscients que le sans-abrisme risque d’augmenter au Canada en raison de la récession, les paliers gouvernementaux supérieurs doivent limiter les dégâts. S’ils sont bien conçus, les efforts de prévention du sans-abrisme peuvent être plus économiques que des réponses d’urgences postérieures.

J’aimerais remercier Susan Falvo, Michel Laforge et Vincent St-Martin pour leur appui pendant la rédaction de ce billet.

[1] Il est également très important de continuer à adresser le sans-abrisme existant. J’ai écrit à ce sujet ici (billet en anglais).

[2] Pour d’autres informations par rapport à la Mesure axée sur les conditions du marché, lisez ce billet (en anglais).

Les effets à long terme de la récession de la COVID-19 sur le sans-abrisme au Canada

The long-term impact of the COVID-19 Recession on homelessness in Canada

The long-term impact of the COVID-19 Recession on homelessness in Canada

La version française de ce billet se trouve ici.

I’ve written a report for Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) that assesses the likely long-term impact of the current recession on homelessness. The link to the report is here.

Here are 10 things to know:

1. The current recession may contribute to rising homelessness across Canada, but that matter is complicated by several factors. Those factors include: a lag effect of up to five years from the time a recession starts until its impact fully plays out; the many unknowns that lie ahead (e.g., whether there will be future waves of the pandemic, when and if a vaccine is developed, what types of new social benefits are announced, etc.); and differences from one community to another (with respect to both the labour market and housing market, for example).

2. A recession’s lag effect stems in part from a strong desire of households to avoid absolute homelessness. When faced with reduced income or outright job loss, a household may try to arrange a rental arrears plan with their landlord; they may also borrow money from family and friends. They may try to move into cheaper housing as well, or move in with family or friends. The lag effect also stems from Canada’s elaborate social welfare system. For example, Employment Insurance (and more recently the Canada Emergency Response Benefit) can cushion the blow from job loss and help households hang on to their housing. Social assistance, while not as generous, can also delay homelessness onset.

3. This lag effect means there is time for senior orders of government to plan homelessness prevention initiatives. Since it could be a few years before we see rising homelessness in some communities as a result of the current recession, there is time for preventive measures to be designed, implemented and to take effect. Those measures could target households that are either at serious risk of becoming homeless or that have just become homeless.[1]

4. The recession’s impact on homelessness will vary from one community to another. Housing markets, income assistance systems and homelessness system planning frameworks vary across Canada. What is more, migration patterns over the next several years will be hard to predict. As a result, it is challenging to say which Canadian communities will see rising homelessness at what junctures in time. We do know that, thus far, the following types of workers in Canada have been most directly affected by the COVID-19 Recession: young people, women, nonmarried persons, and persons without high school accreditation.

5. In order to monitor the many complex factors involved here, policy-makers needs to track various indicators. The report recommends that ESDC track the following indicators as the recession unfolds: the official unemployment rate; the percentage of Canadians falling below the Market Basket Measure (and especially those falling below 75% of the Market Basket Measure);[2] social assistance benefit levels; median rent levels; the rental vacancy rate; the percentage of households with extreme shelter cost burdens; evictions; and average nightly occupancy in emergency shelters.

6. This tracking will require some nuance. As much as possible, such tracking should emphasize both how these indicators have changed since the start of the pandemic, and how this change varies across both geographical areas and specific populations (e.g., women, youth, Indigenous peoples, etc.).

7. The report recommends that the federal government enhance the Canada Housing Benefit (CHB). This benefit provides financial assistance to help low-income households afford rent. It is expected that half of this money will come from the federal government, and the other half from provinces and territories. The CHB was supposed to launch nationally on 1 April 2020; however, just five provinces have formally agreed to terms regarding the CHB. The federal government could increase the value of this benefit, which could encourage other provinces and territories to sign on. For example, the federal government might offer 2/3 or 3/4 cost-sharing.

8. The report also recommends that the federal government take a soft approach to recovering CERB overpayments from social assistance recipients. This is important in light of the considerable confusion that existed as the CERB was being rolled out. Such an approach might include not trying to fully recover the value of the CERB from these individuals (via the tax system). Even complete amnesty should be considered in some cases.

9. The report recommends that ESDC introduce a new funding stream for Reaching Home (i.e., the federal government’s main funding vehicle for homelessness). The report discusses the successful implementation of prevention efforts in the United States following the 2008-2009 Recession, and encourages ESDC to introduce something similar for Canada. A new prevention stream could focus on time-limited financial assistance directed at households who are either still housed (but at risk of becoming homeless), are in the process of losing their housing, or who have just begun to experience absolute homelessness. Targeting can evolve over time, in light of changes seen in the aforementioned indicators (e.g., the official unemployment rate, the percentage of persons with incomes below the Market Basket Measure, etc.).

10. The report identifies policy changes that could be made by provincial and territorial governments. These include increases to social assistance benefit levels, the reinstatement of social assistance eligibility for recipients who became ineligible due to the CERB, and the encouragement of housing-focused practices at emergency shelters.

In sum. Since we know there is serious risk for more homelessness in Canada as a result of the current recession, senior orders of government need to limit the damage. Well-designed prevention efforts can be more cost-effective than emergency responses after the fact.

I wish to thank Susan Falvo and Vincent St-Martin for assistance with this blog post.

[1] It is also very important to continue addressing existing homelessness. I’ve written about that here.

[2] For more on the Market Basket Measure, see this blog post.

Lifting singles out of poverty in Canada

Lifting singles out of poverty in Canada

Lifting singles out of poverty in Canada

I’ve written a report for the Montreal-based Institute for Research on Public Policy making the case for higher social assistance benefit levels for employable single adults without dependants. The link to the report is here.

Here are 10 things to know.

1. In Canada, most employable adult singles without dependants who receive social assistance get less than $10,000/yr. in benefits. This amount of money is ridiculously low (keeping in mind that this figure includes all forms of tax credits received by the recipient). A person with this income must use it to pay for housing, food, transportation and other basic necessities (to see benefit levels in every province and territory, check out Welfare in Canada).

2. In relation to Canada’s official poverty line, social assistance benefit levels for this household group are dismal. ‘Welfare income’—which includes social assistance benefit levels, child benefits and all forms of tax credits—brings couples with two children to between 75% and 95% of the federally-defined poverty line, depending on the province (see figure 1 below). However, welfare income for employable singles without dependants typically comes to about 50% of the poverty line for this particular household type.

  

3. In most provinces and territories, $10,000 is less than half of what a minimum wage earner would earn in one year working full-time hours. Historically, policy-makers and economists have often been nervous about setting social assistance benefit levels high enough to make paid work unattractive. However, that shouldn’t be a major concern right now in most parts of Canada, as the differential between welfare incomes and minimum wage rates is currently quite substantial.

4. Increases to social assistance benefit levels could help Canada’s federal government achieve its poverty reduction targets. In Canada, we say a household is in ‘deep income poverty’ if it makes less than 75% of the official poverty line. Canada’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, unveiled in October 2018, seeks to track progress on this indicator. Increases in social assistance benefit levels would be a very easy way for progress to be made in this respect.

5. Doing so could also help provincial and territorial governments achieve their poverty reduction targets. All provinces and territories now have their own poverty reduction strategies; many of these strategies include targets pertaining to reducing the number of people under the poverty line (New Brunswick’s strategy actually seeks to reduce deep income poverty by 50%). Increasing social assistance benefit levels would help all provinces and territories achieve their targets.

6. More than half of people in Canada who are in ‘deep income poverty’ are singles. Not only do singles receive very low social assistance benefit levels relative to other household types, but they also do not realize many of the economies of scale that come with cohabitating (e.g., shared rent, shared utility costs, etc.). This reality makes this household group all the more worthy of policy attention.

7. Higher social assistance benefit levels can result in less homelessness. It’s intuitive for many of us that higher social assistance benefit levels would both reduce the likelihood of a person losing their housing and also increase the likelihood of a person experiencing homelessness to obtain rental housing on the private market. Research by Ron Kneebone and Margarita Wilkins confirms this, estimating that a $1,500/yr. increase in social assistance benefits for an employable single without dependants would (in 2011) reduce the use of shelter beds on any given night by nearly 20%.

8. Higher benefit levels can improve food security. A recent study in British Columbia confirms this, finding that overall rates of food security improved among social assistance recipients after a one-time increase in social assistance benefit levels in that province. 

9. Less homelessness and improved food security would almost certainly result in public cost savings. The costs of homelessness to the taxpayer are well documented, as are the healthcare costs associated with food insecurity. Put differently, increasing public expenditure on social assistance would likely result in public savings elsewhere.

10. While higher benefit levels would likely lead to more takeup, this increased takeup would be modest. That is precisely the finding of a recent Canadian study that I co-authored with Ali Jadidzadeh. We found that a 10% increase in the real value of social assistance benefit levels for this same household group would likely result in an increase in caseloads of less than 5%.

In sum. When it comes to social assistance across Canada, employable single adults without dependants are a very neglected subgroup. Increasing their benefit levels would likely result in less poverty, improved food security and less homelessness.

 

I wish to thank Susan Falvo, Lynn McIntyre, Vincent St-Martin and Val Tarasuk for assistance with this blog post.

Social assistance: Do higher benefit levels lead to higher caseloads?

Social assistance: Do higher benefit levels lead to higher caseloads?

Social assistance: Do higher benefit levels lead to higher caseloads?

I’ve recently co-authored a journal article[1] with Ali Jadidzadeh that asks the question: Do higher social assistance benefit levels lead to greater take-up? The short answer is yes, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t increase benefit levels.

Here are 11 things to know about the study.

1. The study looks only at employable adult singles without dependants. Other studies asking the same question have looked at other household groups; but ours focuses on single adults without dependants in part because this group receives very little public policy attention, and in part because they comprise most persons experiencing absolute homelessness in Canada.

2. While the study measures the impact of a variety of independent variables on caseloads, the one we were most interested in was benefit levels. Other independent variables considered in the study are: the official unemployment rate; ‘working poor’ income (e.g., third and fourth decile income); population variation over time; and social assistance rule changes.

3. The study uses three alternative models to estimate the impact of these variables. Essentially, different measurement techniques have their strengths and weaknesses, so it’s common for statistical work like this to use a variety of approaches so that the reader can compare findings.

4. The first model finds an important relationship between benefit levels and caseload growth. Specifically, it finds that a 1% increase in the real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) value of benefit levels results in a 0.372% increase in caseloads. This model uses pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), an approach that doesn’t account for provincial fixed effects (i.e., characteristics of provinces that don’t vary over time). These results should therefore be taken less seriously than the other two models.

5. The second model finds a rather modest relationship between increases in benefit levels and caseload growth. Specifically, it finds that a 1% increase in the real value of benefit levels results in just a 0.157% increase in caseloads. This approach uses fixed effects OLS, meaning it accounts for unobservable provincial characteristics.

6. The third model finds the relationship to be a bit stronger. This approach uses Panel Fully Modified OLS and finds a 1% increase in the real value of benefit levels to result in a 0.457% increase in caseloads. This approach is considered good when researchers want to study long-run relationships between continuous (i.e., quantifiable) variables. It’s a relatively new approach that has gained currency in the past five years.

7. There’s an important takeaway from this. Specifically, a 10% increase in the real value of social assistance benefit levels would likely result in caseload growth for this group of between 1.57% and 4.57%. Many observers would consider this to be modest caseload growth.

8. Rule changes are important, but they are difficult to measure. In the mid-1990s, several large provinces introduced strict eligibility criteria (including the introduction of work-for-welfare provisions). The study finds their impact in reducing caseloads to be statistically significant. However, in general, it is very challenging for statistical analysis to measure the impact of rule changes on caseloads.

9. The unemployment rate has a modest impact on caseloads. In the first model, a one percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate is found to be associated with a 7.3% drop in caseloads (in the second model, it’s associated with a 5.8% drop). One implication from this is that provincial and territorial officials should not expect job creation alone to wipe out social assistance caseloads for employable singles.

10. The study cautions policymakers against focusing too much on the sizes of caseloads. In other words, when deciding on the appropriate levels of benefits, the study encourages policymakers to consider positive outcomes associated with higher benefit levels.

11. Higher social assistance benefit levels can help accomplish other policy objectives. As the study points out, they can reduce the percentage of Canadians living in poverty, reduce levels of food insecurity, improve health outcomes and reduce homelessness (all of which can result in savings of their own to the taxpayer). So if higher benefit levels also result in modest caseload growth, that may not be so bad. 

In sum. There are many positive outcomes associated with higher social assistance benefit levels. Having said that, when policymakers decide to increase benefit levels, they should budget for some increased take-up.

I wish to thank the following individuals for assistance with this blog post: Susan Falvo, Ali Jadidzadeh, Richard Shillington and Vincent St-Martin.

[1] For a full copy of the article, please email me at falvo.nicholas@gmail.com.