Les effets à long terme de la récession de la COVID-19 sur le sans-abrisme au Canada

Les effets à long terme de la récession de la COVID-19 sur le sans-abrisme au Canada

Les effets à long terme de la récession de la COVID-19 sur le sans-abrisme au Canada

An English-language version of this blog post is available here.

J’ai rédigé un rapport pour Emploi et Développement social Canada qui présente les impacts les plus probables de la récession actuelle sur le sans-abrisme. Le rapport complet est disponible (en  anglais) ici.

Voici 10 choses à savoir à ce sujet.

  1. La récession actuelle risque de contribuer au sans-abrisme au Canada, mais plusieurs facteurs influenceront son ampleur. Parmi ceux-ci : le ressentiment des effets de la récession pourrait prendre jusqu’à cinq ans; les nombreux inconnus à l’horizon (par exemple, de potentielles vagues subséquentes de la pandémie, le développement d’un vaccin, la nature de futures prestations); les variantes démographiques d’une communauté à l’autre (notamment en ce qui concerne le marché du travail et le marché immobilier).
  1. L’effet de décalage de cinq ans s’explique en partie par la lutte pour éviter de perdre leur logement. Lorsque les ménages affronteront une perte de revenu ou d’emploi, ils pourraient tenter de négocier des arriérés de loyer avec le propriétaire de leur domicile; ils pourraient aussi emprunter de l’argent à des amis ou à d’autres membres de leur famille. Ils pourraient tenter d’emménager avec des amis, de la famille, ou dans un logement plus abordable. Le système de bienêtre social canadien a également pour effet de retarder les effets de la récession. Par exemple, les prestations d’assurance emploi (et plus récemment la Prestation d’urgence canadienne) peuvent atténuer les effets d’une perte d’emploi, aidant ainsi les ménages à maintenir leurs logements. Même si elle est moins généreuse, l’assurance sociale peut également contribuer à retarder le sans-abrisme.
  1. L’effet de décalage donne aussi la chance aux paliers gouvernementaux supérieurs de prévoir des initiatives contre le sans-abrisme. Puisqu’il pourrait prendre encore quelques années pour que l’on perçoive la croissance du sans-abrisme dû à la récession actuelle, il y a suffisamment de temps pour concevoir, implanter et observer les retombées de nouvelles mesures préventives. Ces nouvelles mesures pourraient cibler des ménages qui risquent de perdre leur logement, ou qui sont nouvellement sans-abris.[1] 
  1. L’impact de la récession variera d’une communauté à l’autre à travers le pays. L’état des marchés immobiliers, des systèmes d’aide financière, et de la planification du sans-abrisme varie à travers le Canada. De plus, les trajets des sans-abris migrant à travers le pays seront difficiles à prévoir au cours des prochaines années. Conséquemment, il sera difficile de prévoir dans quelles communautés et à quel moment surviendra l’augmentation du sans-abrisme. Nous savons par contre que les personnes les plus affectées par la récession de la COVID-19 sont : les jeunes, les femmes, les personnes célibataires et les personnes sans diplôme d’études secondaires.
  1. Afin de tenir compte des nombreux facteurs en jeu, les fonctionnaires doivent surveiller une variété d’indicateurs. Le rapport recommande à EDSC de tenir compte des indicateurs suivants tout au long de la récession : le taux de chômage officiel, la proportion de Canadiens qui tombent sous la Mesure axée sur les conditions du marché (surtout ceux qui tombent sous le seuil de 75%)[2]; les taux d’aide sociale; le cout médian des loyers; le taux d’inoccupation des loyers; la proportion de ménages qui consacre plus de 50% de leur revenu sur l’habitation; les expulsions; et le taux d’occupation quotidien des refuges d’urgence.
  1. Il faudra faire preuve de nuances avec ces données. Autant que possible, il faudra surveiller l’évolution de ces indicateurs depuis le début de la pandémie, ainsi qu’à travers les différentes régions et groupes démographiques précis (par exemple les femmes, les jeunes, les Autochtones, etc.)
  1. Le rapport recommande au gouvernement fédéral d’améliorer l’Allocation canadienne pour le logement (ACL). Cette prestation offre une aide financière aux foyers à faible revenu afin de payer leur loyer. Il est prévu que la moitié de cet argent proviendra du gouvernement fédéral, et que l’autre moitié proviendra des gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux. L’ACL devait être lancée le 1er avril 2020, cependant, il n’y a que cinq provinces qui ont signé l’entente. Le gouvernement fédéral pourrait augmenter son apport à l’ACL afin d’encourager le restant des provinces et territoires à en faire autant. Par exemple, le gouvernement fédéral pourrait offrir d’assurer les deux tiers ou les trois quarts des couts.
  1. Le rapport recommande également que le gouvernement fédéral fasse preuve de souplesse quant au recouvrement des montants excédentaires de la Prestation canadienne d’urgence (PUC) versés aux prestataires d’aide sociale. Il est nécessaire de souligner ce point vu la confusion considérable entourant le lancement de la PUC. Une telle approche pourrait comprendre un recouvrement partiel chez ces individus (par l’entremise du système d’impôts), et une amnistie totale devrait être considérée dans certains cas. 
  1. Le rapport recommande qu’EDSC mette sur pied une nouvelle source de financement pour le programme Vers un chez-soi (le véhicule principal par lequel le gouvernement fédéral lutte contre le sans-abrisme). Le rapport aborde la réussite d’effets préventifs aux États-Unis à la suite de la récession de 2008-2009, et encourage EDSC à mettre sur pied un programme semblable au Canada. Le programme pourrait mettre de l’avant une aide financière de courte-durée pour les ménages qui sont à risque de perdre leur logement, en train de le perdre, ou qui l’ont perdu récemment. Les cibles pourraient évoluer au fil du temps, à la lumière de changements survenant dans les indicateurs mentionnés précédemment (taux de chômage officiel, proportion des gens avec des revenus inférieurs à la Mesure axée sur les conditions du marché, etc.).
  1. Le rapport propose des changements politiques que pourraient entamer les gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux. Ceux-ci comprennent une augmentation des prestations d’aide sociale, de rétablir l’admissibilité des gens disqualifiés de l’aide sociale à cause de la PUC, et encourager les refuges d’urgence à prioriser les solutions basées sur le logement.

En résumé, puisque nous sommes conscients que le sans-abrisme risque d’augmenter au Canada en raison de la récession, les paliers gouvernementaux supérieurs doivent limiter les dégâts. S’ils sont bien conçus, les efforts de prévention du sans-abrisme peuvent être plus économiques que des réponses d’urgences postérieures.

J’aimerais remercier Susan Falvo, Michel Laforge et Vincent St-Martin pour leur appui pendant la rédaction de ce billet.

[1] Il est également très important de continuer à adresser le sans-abrisme existant. J’ai écrit à ce sujet ici (billet en anglais).

[2] Pour d’autres informations par rapport à la Mesure axée sur les conditions du marché, lisez ce billet (en anglais).

Les effets à long terme de la récession de la COVID-19 sur le sans-abrisme au Canada

The long-term impact of the COVID-19 Recession on homelessness in Canada

The long-term impact of the COVID-19 Recession on homelessness in Canada

La version française de ce billet se trouve ici.

I’ve written a report for Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) that assesses the likely long-term impact of the current recession on homelessness. The link to the report is here.

Here are 10 things to know:

1. The current recession may contribute to rising homelessness across Canada, but that matter is complicated by several factors. Those factors include: a lag effect of up to five years from the time a recession starts until its impact fully plays out; the many unknowns that lie ahead (e.g., whether there will be future waves of the pandemic, when and if a vaccine is developed, what types of new social benefits are announced, etc.); and differences from one community to another (with respect to both the labour market and housing market, for example).

2. A recession’s lag effect stems in part from a strong desire of households to avoid absolute homelessness. When faced with reduced income or outright job loss, a household may try to arrange a rental arrears plan with their landlord; they may also borrow money from family and friends. They may try to move into cheaper housing as well, or move in with family or friends. The lag effect also stems from Canada’s elaborate social welfare system. For example, Employment Insurance (and more recently the Canada Emergency Response Benefit) can cushion the blow from job loss and help households hang on to their housing. Social assistance, while not as generous, can also delay homelessness onset.

3. This lag effect means there is time for senior orders of government to plan homelessness prevention initiatives. Since it could be a few years before we see rising homelessness in some communities as a result of the current recession, there is time for preventive measures to be designed, implemented and to take effect. Those measures could target households that are either at serious risk of becoming homeless or that have just become homeless.[1]

4. The recession’s impact on homelessness will vary from one community to another. Housing markets, income assistance systems and homelessness system planning frameworks vary across Canada. What is more, migration patterns over the next several years will be hard to predict. As a result, it is challenging to say which Canadian communities will see rising homelessness at what junctures in time. We do know that, thus far, the following types of workers in Canada have been most directly affected by the COVID-19 Recession: young people, women, nonmarried persons, and persons without high school accreditation.

5. In order to monitor the many complex factors involved here, policy-makers needs to track various indicators. The report recommends that ESDC track the following indicators as the recession unfolds: the official unemployment rate; the percentage of Canadians falling below the Market Basket Measure (and especially those falling below 75% of the Market Basket Measure);[2] social assistance benefit levels; median rent levels; the rental vacancy rate; the percentage of households with extreme shelter cost burdens; evictions; and average nightly occupancy in emergency shelters.

6. This tracking will require some nuance. As much as possible, such tracking should emphasize both how these indicators have changed since the start of the pandemic, and how this change varies across both geographical areas and specific populations (e.g., women, youth, Indigenous peoples, etc.).

7. The report recommends that the federal government enhance the Canada Housing Benefit (CHB). This benefit provides financial assistance to help low-income households afford rent. It is expected that half of this money will come from the federal government, and the other half from provinces and territories. The CHB was supposed to launch nationally on 1 April 2020; however, just five provinces have formally agreed to terms regarding the CHB. The federal government could increase the value of this benefit, which could encourage other provinces and territories to sign on. For example, the federal government might offer 2/3 or 3/4 cost-sharing.

8. The report also recommends that the federal government take a soft approach to recovering CERB overpayments from social assistance recipients. This is important in light of the considerable confusion that existed as the CERB was being rolled out. Such an approach might include not trying to fully recover the value of the CERB from these individuals (via the tax system). Even complete amnesty should be considered in some cases.

9. The report recommends that ESDC introduce a new funding stream for Reaching Home (i.e., the federal government’s main funding vehicle for homelessness). The report discusses the successful implementation of prevention efforts in the United States following the 2008-2009 Recession, and encourages ESDC to introduce something similar for Canada. A new prevention stream could focus on time-limited financial assistance directed at households who are either still housed (but at risk of becoming homeless), are in the process of losing their housing, or who have just begun to experience absolute homelessness. Targeting can evolve over time, in light of changes seen in the aforementioned indicators (e.g., the official unemployment rate, the percentage of persons with incomes below the Market Basket Measure, etc.).

10. The report identifies policy changes that could be made by provincial and territorial governments. These include increases to social assistance benefit levels, the reinstatement of social assistance eligibility for recipients who became ineligible due to the CERB, and the encouragement of housing-focused practices at emergency shelters.

In sum. Since we know there is serious risk for more homelessness in Canada as a result of the current recession, senior orders of government need to limit the damage. Well-designed prevention efforts can be more cost-effective than emergency responses after the fact.

I wish to thank Susan Falvo and Vincent St-Martin for assistance with this blog post.

[1] It is also very important to continue addressing existing homelessness. I’ve written about that here.

[2] For more on the Market Basket Measure, see this blog post.

Ten Things to Know About Homelessness in Canada

Ten Things to Know About Homelessness in Canada

Ten Things to Know About Homelessness in Canada

This afternoon I gave a presentation at Raising the Roof’s Child & Family Homelessness Stakeholder Summit in Toronto. My slide deck can be downloaded here. To accompany the presentation, I’ve prepared the following list of Ten Things to Know About Homelessness in Canada.

1.Efforts to enumerate persons experiencing homeless have generally been spotty, but it is reasonable to assert that homelessness in Canada saw substantial growth in the 1980s and 1990s. On a nightly basis in Toronto, there were about 1,000 persons per night staying in emergency shelters in 1980. By 1990, that figure had doubled. And ten years later, there were 4,000 persons per night staying in Toronto’s emergency shelters. The Toronto figure of 4,000 per night has remained relatively constant for the past 15 years, though it has edged up in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 recession a phenomenon which I’ve previously written about here. (Admittedly, the number of persons living in emergency shelters on a nightly basis is a rather narrow gauge of homelessness. According to Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, approximately 13% of Canadian households are in core housing need; for Nunavut, the figure is a whopping 39%.)

2. Though it’s difficult to establish causation, I think relatively safe assumptions can be made about some of the major contributors to homelessness. Researchers are generally careful about using the term causation in fact, there are long-standing tensions among academic disciplines as to what methodological approaches are required to establish it. Statisticians, for example, generally believe that randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are needed to establish causation; but as David Freedman has argued, RCTs are often impractical or unethical (Freedman, 1999, p. 255). Rather, careful researchers are more likely to say things like these factors have likely contributed to this effect,” or “I think it’s likely that this effect caused this to happen And with that in mind, I’d like to suggest that there are probably three major factors that have contributed to homelessness in Canada: 1) macroeconomic factors (especially unemployment); 2) changes to our social welfare system (including a decrease in the availability of government-subsidized housing); and 3) the design and administration of policies whose specific intent is to respond directly to homelessness (often referred to as ‘systems responses’ to homelessness).

3. Homelessness has profound ramifications on the lives of children. As I wrote in 2012: Two studies have been done in Toronto looking at the role of housing with respect to children in care. Results of both studies indicate that the state of the family housing was a factor in one in five cases in which a child was temporarily admitted into care. Results from the Toronto research also indicate that, in one in 10 cases, housing status delayed the return home of a child from care (Falvo, 2012, p. 14). Other research estimates that, on an annual basis in Toronto alone, approximately 300 babies are born to mothers who are homeless. (Of course, homelessness can have profound ramifications on the lives of adults as well. For more on this, see this 2007 study.)

4. The role of Canada’s federal government in funding both housing for low-income persons and programming for homeless persons has varied considerably over time. Provinces and territories spend much more of their own money on housing for low-income persons when the federal government leads. Thus, a considerable amount of subsidized housing for low-income Canadians was built from the mid-1960s through to the early 1990s. Since the early 1990s, comparatively little subsidized housing has been built for low-income persons in Canada. I should also note that the annual, inflation-adjusted value of federal funding for homelessness today is worth just 35% of what it was worth in 1999.

5. Not every province/territory responds to homelessness in the same way. While much mores subsidized housing for low-income persons gets built when the federal government leads, provinces and territories don’t always respond to federal funding initiatives in the same way. For example, between 2002 and 2013, three times as many subsidized housing units were built in Alberta (on a per capita basis) than in Ontario. I would argue that a driving force behind this differential stems from Alberta’s strong economic performance during this same period relative to that of Ontario’s.

6. Though a careful researcher will be cautious in discussing what causes homelessness, I think we know a lot about what solves it. In many cases, a person who stays in an emergency shelter will exit homelessness without substantial public resources. In some cases, they might find housing on their own; in other cases, family and friends may provide them with short term assistance e.g. some financial support, a couch to sleep on, etc. (To learn more about lengths of stay in homeless shelters in a sample of Canadian cities, see this 2013 study.) Researchers and advocates for the homeless generally don’t view such short-term stays as a major public policy challenge the bigger challenge is in the case of persons who stay in emergency shelters (and outside) for longer periods of time. Even here though, I would argue that it’s hardly a mystery as to what constitutes an effective policy response.

Indeed, as early as the mid-1980s, small non-profit organizations in Ontario (and possibly in other provinces as well) found success in building subsidized housing for persons who had experienced long-term homelessness they did so by providing professional staff support to help such tenants live independently in those units. This was (and still is) known as supportive housing. The emergence of supportive housing in Ontario happened in large part due to strong advocacy by community-based groups. This included: the Singles Displaced Persons Project; the consumer/survivor movement; the slogan homes not hostels the founding of Houselink Community Homes; and the founding of Homes First Society. Conditions of eligibility for such housing varied from one provider to the next. In many cases, the tenant did not have to prove housing readiness before being offered a unit. In fact, Homes First Society got its name because its founders believed that its tenants needed homes first before addressing other challenges (i.e. mental health, substance use, employment, etc.).

Today, researchers, practitioners and advocates refer to this approach ashousing first. And very recently, a successful RCT of housing first was conducted in five Canadian cities; I’ve previously written about that study here.

7. There are several ways of making housing available to low-income households; all of them involve the private sector to varying degrees. Sometimes when government subsidizes housing for low-income persons, it provides money to a non-profit entity that develops, owns and operates the units. Other times, government provides a subsidy to landlords (either for-profit or non-profit); in exchange for the subsidy, the landlord agree to rent units at a reduced rate for a specified period of time (e.g. in some cases, for 10 years). And other times, government provides money (often known as a housing allowance) to low-income tenants who then rent a unit from a for-profit landlord. Of the three possible approaches, I personally have a preference for the option where a non-profit entity develops, owns and operates the units (and I have previously written about this here). Having said that, I think there’s a place for all three approaches, depending on local context.

8. Some jurisdictions have used sophisticated information management systems as part of their efforts to respond to homelessness. Many organizations serving homeless persons in Calgary enter client information into a database called the Homelessness Management Information System, a system that is also used in many American cities. Client-level information (such as age, health status, employment status and housing status) is entered into the database when an initial intake is done. While the client is receiving services, updated information is entered again; in the case of some programs, follow-up assessments are done every three months. In the case of some program types, there are both exit and post-exit follow-up assessments completed. All information-gathering is subject to provincial privacy legislation. There are many uses for the data once it’s gathered. For example, some organizations use the data to provide case management services to clients. Also, funders are able to assess each organization’s performance against benchmarks (i.e. percentage of clients who receive housing after a specific period of time).

9. When it comes to both preventing and responding to homelessness, the capacity of government to generate revenue matters a great deal.Governments typically use revenue generated from taxation to finance both subsidized housing and other important social programs. When tax revenue decreases, many governments have less ability to spend on such programs. Since the mid-1990s, tax revenue in Canada (measured as a percentage of our Gross Domestic Product) has decreased substantially. If this trend doesn’t reverse itself soon, it will be very challenging for many governments (especially provincial, territorial and municipal governments) to invest in important social programs. There is currently a move afoot by some Canadians to increase taxes; it is led by Alex Himelfarb, former Clerk of the Privy Council. Alex and his son Jordan recently co-edited a book that calls for the need for higher taxation in Canada. (Note: according to some schools of thought, it isn’t necessary for a sovereign government with its own currency to tax more in order to finance more social spending. While keeping in mind that such an approach would be most relevant to Canada’s federal government and much less relevant to provincial, territorial and municipal governments readers can read more about one such school of thought here.)

10. Over the course of the next decade, Canada will likely see substantial increases in homelessness among both seniors and Indigenous peoples (First Nation, Metis and Inuit). Seniors and Indigenous peoples are growing as a percentage of Canada’s total population. Further, the percentage of seniors living below Statistics Canada’s Low-Income Measure has grown substantially since the mid-1990s. I think all of this makes it likely that both of these groups will begin to grow as a percentage of Canada’s homeless populations.

The following individuals were very helpful in helping me prepare the present blog post: Maroine Bendaoud, Lisa Burke, George Fallis, Greg Suttor, Francesco Falvo, Louise Gallagher, Ali Jadidzadeh, Lisa Ker, Jennifer Legate, Kevin McNichol, Richard Shillington, Blake Thomas and Mike Veall. Any errors are mine.