Ten things to know about Canada’s 2021 federal budget

Ten things to know about Canada’s 2021 federal budget

by | Apr 30, 2021 | Aboriginal Peoples, Canada, Ending Homelessness, Federal Budget, Fiscal policy, Government, Government Funding, Health Care, Homeless, Housing, Housing First, Income, Income Support, Indigenous peoples, Policy, Poverty, Poverty Reduction, Social Housing, Social Policy

Ten things to know about Canada’s 2021 federal budget

La version française de ce billet se trouve ici.

On April 21, the Trudeau government tabled the 2021 federal budget. The budget includes additional COVID-related measures,[1] a major childcare initiative, and various forms of support for low-income Canadians (including for housing and homelessness).

Here are 10 things to know.

1. The budget commits “up to $30 billion over five years” for early learning and childcare.  The Government of Canada sets out the following goal: “That, in the next 5 years, Canadian parents across the country have access to high quality early learning and childcare, for an average of $10 a day.” This may be the single most important social policy announcement made by any federal government at any point in the past 25 years. But in order for this to be successful, considerable cooperation will be required from provincial and territorial governments.

2. The budget announces major changes to financial assistance for post-secondary students. The Government of Canada is making the grant system more generous and the loan system more forgiving. While the value of grants had doubled as a COVID measure, the budget announces that these enhanced amounts will remain in place until July 2023. Also, students earning less than $40,000 will now be exempt from making payments on their loans, while the previous threshold had been $25,000.[2]

3. The budget proposes important support for seniors, including for long-term care and income support. The budget proposes $3 billion over five years “to support provinces and territories in ensuring standards for long-term care are applied…” The budget also proposes a one-time payment of $500 in August 2021 to Old Age Security (OAS) recipients aged 75 or over. It further proposes to introduce legislation that would permanently increase OAS payments for recipients aged 75 and over by 10%.

4. Low-wage workers will receive additional assistance. The Government of Canada announced its intention to raise the federal minimum wage to $15/hr., indexed to inflation, “with provisions to ensure that where provincial or territorial minimum wages are higher, that wage will prevail.” This directly affects over 26,000 workers in the federally-regulated private sector. The budget also proposes to expand the Canada Workers Benefit to support approximately 1 million additional Canadians in low-wage jobs, meaning “that for the first time, most full-time workers earning minimum wage will receive significant support from this important benefit…A single, full-time, minimum wage worker could receive about $1,000 more in benefits than they would under the current system…” This will be especially helpful for single adults without dependants.[3]

5. The budget proposes important new investments for Indigenous peoples. This includes “more than $6 billion to help close infrastructure gaps in Indigenous communities, and $2.2 billion for actions to end the national tragedy of missing and murdered Indigenous women and girls.” It did not announce an urban, rural and northern Indigenous housing strategy, as many advocates had expected.

6. The budget announces $1.5 billion in new funding for the Rapid Housing Initiative (RHI). Launched in September 2020, this program focuses on the creation of modular housing, the acquisition of land, and the conversion of existing buildings into affordable housing. RHI provides up-front grants for each unit, but relies on provincial and territorial governments to fund ongoing costs.

7. The Canada Housing Benefit will be enhanced. Specifically, an additional $315.4 million over seven years has been committed “for low-income women and children fleeing violence to help with their rent payments.” This benefit was first announced in November 2017. Unfortunately, many provincial and territorial governments have been slow to sign bilateral agreements with the Government of Canada, thus delaying take up.

8. The National Housing Co-Investment Fund (NHCF) has received enhancements. This includes $750 million in new funding, as well as $250 million to support the construction, repair, and operating costs of transitional housing and shelter spaces for women and children fleeing violence (however, it is not clear how much of this consists of grants vs. loans). The NHCF, originally announced in 2017, contains both grants and loans, but has been criticized for being mostly a loan program. It has also been criticized for its onerous application and approval process.

9. This government continues to increase annual funding for homelessness. This budget proposes an additional $567 million over two years, beginning in 2022-23, for Reaching Home (i.e., the federal government’s main funding vehicle for homelessness). This preserves the 2021-22 funding levels announced in the Fall Economic Statement in response to the pandemic. The budget also proposes $45 million over two years for a pilot program “aimed at reducing veteran homelessness through the provision of rent supplements and wrap-around services for homeless veterans such as counselling, addiction treatment, and help finding a job.”

10. An assortment of other housing-related measures was announced. This includes: a national 1% tax on vacant property owned by non-residents; $600 million over seven years “to renew and expand the Affordable Housing Innovation Fund, which encourages new funding models and innovative building techniques in the affordable housing sector;” $118.2 million over seven years for the Federal Community Housing Initiative (for operators of federally-administered co-op housing units); a reallocation of $300 million in loan funds from the Rental Construction Financing Initiative to support the conversion of vacant commercial property into rental housing; $25 million in new housing funding for the Northwest Territories; and $25 million in housing for Nunavut.

In sum. This budget contains important new social investments, especially for childcare. It includes important new funding enhancements for low-income Canadians, including for affordable housing and homelessness. And it does so at a time when federal debt-serving costs are low by historical standards due to low interest rates.

I wish to thank the following individuals for assistance with this blog post: George Fallis, Martha Friendly, Rob Gillezeau, Michel Laforge, David Macdonald, Rianne Mahon, Michael Mendelson, Jeff Morrison, Steve Pomeroy, Shayne Ramsay, Sylvia Regnier, Vincent St-Martin and Greg Suttor. I also wish to thank HomeSpace Society for permission to use the photo that appears above.

—

[1] These include the extension of the wage subsidy, rent subsidy, and Lockdown Support for businesses and other employers until September 2021. Together, these particular measures amount to $12.1 billion in additional support.

[2]  For a thorough overview of all changes announced to post-secondary education, check out this analysis.

[3] For more on the income-related challenges of single adults without dependants, see this recent report.

Ten things to know about Canada’s 2021 federal budget

10 faits saillants à retenir du budget fédéral canadien 2021

by | Apr 30, 2021 | Aboriginal Peoples, Canada, Ending Homelessness, Federal Budget, Fiscal policy, Government, Government Funding, Health Care, Homeless, Housing, Income, Income Support, Indigenous peoples, Labour Market, Policy, Poverty, Poverty Reduction, Social Housing, Social Policy

10 faits saillants à retenir du budget fédéral canadien 2021

An English-language version of this blog post is available here.

Le 21 avril, le gouvernement Trudeau a déposé le budget fédéral 2021. Celui-ci comprend de nouvelles mesures liées à la pandémie[1], une initiative importante de services de garde d’enfants, et plusieurs initiatives pour appuyer les Canadiens à faible revenu (dont des initiatives en logement et en sans-abrisme).

Voici 10 faits saillants à son sujet.

1. Jusqu’à 30 milliards de dollars seront consacrés à l’éducation et aux services de garde pour la petite-enfance. Le gouvernement du Canada a promis qu’« au cours des cinq prochaines années, les parents canadiens de partout au pays [auront] accès à des services d’apprentissage et de garde des jeunes enfants à un coût moyen de 10 $ par jour ». C’est peut-être la politique sociale la plus importante de n’importe quel gouvernement fédéral en 25 ans. Par contre, pour que cette politique soit réalisée correctement, la collaboration des gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux sera indispensable.

2. Le système d’aide financière pour les étudiants du postsecondaire connaîtra des changements majeurs. Le gouvernement du Canada rendra le système de bourses plus généreux, et celui des prêts plus indulgent. Bien que la valeur des bourses a doublé pour répondre à la pandémie, le budget annonce que ces mesures demeureront en place jusqu’en juillet 2023. De plus, les étudiants qui intègrent le marché du travail et qui gagnent moins de 40 000$ par année seront exemptés du remboursement de leurs prêts, alors que le seuil précédent était de 25 000$[2].

3. Le budget propose d’importantes mesures pour appuyer les personnes ainées, dont les soins de longue durée et un soutien au revenu. Le budget propose 3 milliards de dollars sur cinq ans pour « appuyer les provinces et territoires à assurer que les standards en soins de longue durée […] ». Le budget propose également de remettre un paiement de 500$ aux prestataires de la pension de la Sécurité de la vieillesse (SV) âgés de 75 ans ou plus en août 2021. Il propose également d’augmenter les paiements de la SV à ces prestataires de 10% de manière permanente.

4. Les travailleurs à faible revenu recevront plus d’appui. Le gouvernement du Canada a annoncé qu’il avait l’intention d’augmenter le salaire minimum à 15$/heure, indexé selon l’inflation, « avec des dispositions destinées à garantir que lorsque le salaire minimum provincial ou territorial sera plus élevé, ce salaire prévaudra ». Cette mesure touche plus de 26 000 travailleurs du secteur privé assujetti aux règlementations fédérales. Le budget propose également l’expansion de l’Allocation canadienne pour les travailleurs afin d’appuyer plus d’un million de Canadiens avec des emplois à faible revenu. Signifiant « que pour la première fois, les personnes travaillant à temps plein au salaire minimum bénéficieront d’un soutien considérable grâce à cette importante allocation […] Un travailleur seul à temps plein touchant le salaire minimum pourrait recevoir environ 1 000 $ de plus en prestations que ce qu’il reçoit dans le système actuel ». Cela viendrait appuyer davantage les adultes célibataires sans personne à charge[3].

5. Le budget propose d’importants nouveaux investissements pour les peuples autochtones. Cela comprend « plus de 6 milliards de dollars pour aider à combler les lacunes en matière d’infrastructure dans les communautés autochtones et 2,2 milliards destinés à des mesures pour mettre fin à la tragédie nationale des femmes et des filles autochtones disparues et assassinées ». Malgré l’avis de plusieurs experts, ces nouveaux investissements ne comprenaient pas de stratégie pour le logement autochtone urbain, rural et nordique.

6. Le budget annonce 1,5 milliard en nouveaux fonds pour l’Initiative pour la création rapide de logements (ICRL). Lancée en 2021, ce programme sert à construire de nouveaux logements mobiles, l’acquisition de terrains, et la réaffectation d’édifices en logements abordables. L’ICRL offre des subventions pour la mise sur pied de chaque unité, mais a recours aux gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux pour financer les coûts opérationnels.

7. L’Allocation canadienne pour le logement sera améliorée. On consacrera 315,4 millions de dollars sur sept ans pour « pour accroître le soutien financier offert directement aux femmes à faible revenu fuyant la violence et leurs enfants afin de les aider à payer leur loyer ». L’annonce de cette prestation remonte à novembre 2017. Malheureusement, plusieurs gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux tardent à signer des ententes bilatérales avec le gouvernement du Canada, retardant sa mise en oeuvre.

8. Le Fonds national de co-investissement pour le logement (FNCIL) a été amélioré. Ceux-ci comptent 750 millions de dollars en financement, et 250 millions de dollars pour appuyer la construction, la réparation, et les frais de fonctionnement des logements temporaires pour les femmes et les enfants fuyants la violence (il n’est toutefois pas clair quelle proportion de ces montants sont des subventions ou de prêts). Le FNCIL, qui date de 2017, a fait l’objet de critiques puisqu’il offre surtout des prêts, et en raison de son onéreux processus de demande et d’approbation.

9. Ce gouvernement continue à augmenter le financement des initiatives pour lutter contre l’itinérance. Le budget propose 567$ million de dollars de plus, sur une période de deux ans, débutant en 2022-2023, pour le programme Vers un chez-soi (la stratégie canadienne de lutte contre l’itinérance). Le gouvernement maintient donc le niveau de financement issu de l’énoncé économique de l’automne 2021. Le budget propose également 45 millions de dollars sur deux ans pour un projet pilote « visant à réduire le nombre de vétérans en situation d’itinérance à l’aide du versement de suppléments de loyer et de la prestation de services complets pour les vétérans sans abri comme le counseling, le traitement de la toxicomanie et [de] l’aide à trouver un emploi ».

10. Une variété d’autres mesures reliées au logement ont également été annoncées. Parmi celles-ci : une taxe d’un pour cent sur les propriétés vacantes appartenant à des non-résidents; 600 millions de dollars sur sept ans « pour renouveler et élargir le Fonds d’innovation pour le logement abordable, ce qui favorise de nouveaux modèles de financement et des techniques de construction novatrices dans le secteur du logement abordable »; 118,2 millions de dollars sur sept ans pour l’Initiative fédérale de logement communautaire (pour les entrepreneurs de logements coopératifs administrés par le fédéral); une réaffectation d’un prêt de 300 millions de dollars du programme de Financement de la construction de logements locatifs afin d’appuyer la transformation de propriété commerciale vacante en logement locatif; 25 millions de dollars pour de nouveaux logements dans les Territoires du Nord-Ouest; 25 millions de dollars pour de nouveaux logements au Nunavut.

En conclusion. Ce budget consacre d’importantes nouvelles sommes à des initiatives sociales, surtout par le biais de services de garderie. Il prévoit également de nouveaux fonds pour les Canadiens à faible revenu, incluant du logement et des mesures pour lutter contre l’itinérance. Il le fait également à un moment où les coûts liés au service de la dette sont faibles en raison de taux d’intérêt bas.

Je souhaite remercier les personnes suivantes pour leur appui à la rédaction de ce billet : George Fallis, Martha Friendly, Rob Gillezeau, Michel Laforge, David Macdonald, Rianne Mahon, Michael Mendelson, Jeff Morrison, Steve Pomeroy, Shayne Ramsay, Sylvia Regnier, Vincent St-Martin et Greg Suttor. Je souhaite également remercier HomeSpace Society pour l’usage de la photo ci-dessus.

[1] Ceux-ci comprennent le prolongement de la subvention salariale, la subvention sur le logement, la mesure de soutien pour les entreprises et d’autres employeurs jusqu’en septembre 2021. La somme de ces mesures totalise 12.1 milliards de dollars en appui additionnel.

[2]  Pour une analyse complète des nouvelles mesures affectant le postsecondaire, jetez un coup d’oeil à cette analyse (en anglais).

[3] Pour plus d’informations concernants les défis financiers des adultes célibataires sans personne à charge, consultez ce rapport récent (en anglais).

The long-term impact of the COVID-19 Recession on homelessness in Canada

The long-term impact of the COVID-19 Recession on homelessness in Canada

by | Dec 10, 2020 | Cities, Demographics, Determinants of Homelessness, Employment, Employment Insurance, Ending Homelessness, Fiscal policy, Government, Government Funding, Homeless, Housing, Housing First, Income Support, Labour Market, Macroeconomics, municipalities, Pitching new programs to government, Point in time Count, Policy, Poverty, Poverty Reduction, Research and Data, Social Assistance, Social Policy, Unemployment

The long-term impact of the COVID-19 Recession on homelessness in Canada

La version française de ce billet se trouve ici.

I’ve written a report for Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) that assesses the likely long-term impact of the current recession on homelessness. The link to the report is here.

Here are 10 things to know:

1. The current recession may contribute to rising homelessness across Canada, but that matter is complicated by several factors. Those factors include: a lag effect of up to five years from the time a recession starts until its impact fully plays out; the many unknowns that lie ahead (e.g., whether there will be future waves of the pandemic, when and if a vaccine is developed, what types of new social benefits are announced, etc.); and differences from one community to another (with respect to both the labour market and housing market, for example).

2. A recession’s lag effect stems in part from a strong desire of households to avoid absolute homelessness. When faced with reduced income or outright job loss, a household may try to arrange a rental arrears plan with their landlord; they may also borrow money from family and friends. They may try to move into cheaper housing as well, or move in with family or friends. The lag effect also stems from Canada’s elaborate social welfare system. For example, Employment Insurance (and more recently the Canada Emergency Response Benefit) can cushion the blow from job loss and help households hang on to their housing. Social assistance, while not as generous, can also delay homelessness onset.

3. This lag effect means there is time for senior orders of government to plan homelessness prevention initiatives. Since it could be a few years before we see rising homelessness in some communities as a result of the current recession, there is time for preventive measures to be designed, implemented and to take effect. Those measures could target households that are either at serious risk of becoming homeless or that have just become homeless.[1]

4. The recession’s impact on homelessness will vary from one community to another. Housing markets, income assistance systems and homelessness system planning frameworks vary across Canada. What is more, migration patterns over the next several years will be hard to predict. As a result, it is challenging to say which Canadian communities will see rising homelessness at what junctures in time. We do know that, thus far, the following types of workers in Canada have been most directly affected by the COVID-19 Recession: young people, women, nonmarried persons, and persons without high school accreditation.

5. In order to monitor the many complex factors involved here, policy-makers needs to track various indicators. The report recommends that ESDC track the following indicators as the recession unfolds: the official unemployment rate; the percentage of Canadians falling below the Market Basket Measure (and especially those falling below 75% of the Market Basket Measure);[2] social assistance benefit levels; median rent levels; the rental vacancy rate; the percentage of households with extreme shelter cost burdens; evictions; and average nightly occupancy in emergency shelters.

6. This tracking will require some nuance. As much as possible, such tracking should emphasize both how these indicators have changed since the start of the pandemic, and how this change varies across both geographical areas and specific populations (e.g., women, youth, Indigenous peoples, etc.).

7. The report recommends that the federal government enhance the Canada Housing Benefit (CHB). This benefit provides financial assistance to help low-income households afford rent. It is expected that half of this money will come from the federal government, and the other half from provinces and territories. The CHB was supposed to launch nationally on 1 April 2020; however, just five provinces have formally agreed to terms regarding the CHB. The federal government could increase the value of this benefit, which could encourage other provinces and territories to sign on. For example, the federal government might offer 2/3 or 3/4 cost-sharing.

8. The report also recommends that the federal government take a soft approach to recovering CERB overpayments from social assistance recipients. This is important in light of the considerable confusion that existed as the CERB was being rolled out. Such an approach might include not trying to fully recover the value of the CERB from these individuals (via the tax system). Even complete amnesty should be considered in some cases.

9. The report recommends that ESDC introduce a new funding stream for Reaching Home (i.e., the federal government’s main funding vehicle for homelessness). The report discusses the successful implementation of prevention efforts in the United States following the 2008-2009 Recession, and encourages ESDC to introduce something similar for Canada. A new prevention stream could focus on time-limited financial assistance directed at households who are either still housed (but at risk of becoming homeless), are in the process of losing their housing, or who have just begun to experience absolute homelessness. Targeting can evolve over time, in light of changes seen in the aforementioned indicators (e.g., the official unemployment rate, the percentage of persons with incomes below the Market Basket Measure, etc.).

10. The report identifies policy changes that could be made by provincial and territorial governments. These include increases to social assistance benefit levels, the reinstatement of social assistance eligibility for recipients who became ineligible due to the CERB, and the encouragement of housing-focused practices at emergency shelters.

In sum. Since we know there is serious risk for more homelessness in Canada as a result of the current recession, senior orders of government need to limit the damage. Well-designed prevention efforts can be more cost-effective than emergency responses after the fact.

I wish to thank Susan Falvo and Vincent St-Martin for assistance with this blog post.

[1] It is also very important to continue addressing existing homelessness. I’ve written about that here.

[2] For more on the Market Basket Measure, see this blog post.

Lifting singles out of poverty in Canada

Lifting singles out of poverty in Canada

by | Dec 2, 2020 | Canada, Demographics, Determinants of Homelessness, Employment, Ending Homelessness, Fiscal policy, Government, Government Funding, Health Care, Homeless, Housing, Income, Income Distribution, Income Inequality, Income Support, Labour Market, Policy, Poverty, Poverty Reduction, Social Assistance, Social Policy, Unemployment

Lifting singles out of poverty in Canada

I’ve written a report for the Montreal-based Institute for Research on Public Policy making the case for higher social assistance benefit levels for employable single adults without dependants. The link to the report is here.

Here are 10 things to know.

1. In Canada, most employable adult singles without dependants who receive social assistance get less than $10,000/yr. in benefits. This amount of money is ridiculously low (keeping in mind that this figure includes all forms of tax credits received by the recipient). A person with this income must use it to pay for housing, food, transportation and other basic necessities (to see benefit levels in every province and territory, check out Welfare in Canada).

2. In relation to Canada’s official poverty line, social assistance benefit levels for this household group are dismal. ‘Welfare income’—which includes social assistance benefit levels, child benefits and all forms of tax credits—brings couples with two children to between 75% and 95% of the federally-defined poverty line, depending on the province (see figure 1 below). However, welfare income for employable singles without dependants typically comes to about 50% of the poverty line for this particular household type.

  

3. In most provinces and territories, $10,000 is less than half of what a minimum wage earner would earn in one year working full-time hours. Historically, policy-makers and economists have often been nervous about setting social assistance benefit levels high enough to make paid work unattractive. However, that shouldn’t be a major concern right now in most parts of Canada, as the differential between welfare incomes and minimum wage rates is currently quite substantial.

4. Increases to social assistance benefit levels could help Canada’s federal government achieve its poverty reduction targets. In Canada, we say a household is in ‘deep income poverty’ if it makes less than 75% of the official poverty line. Canada’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, unveiled in October 2018, seeks to track progress on this indicator. Increases in social assistance benefit levels would be a very easy way for progress to be made in this respect.

5. Doing so could also help provincial and territorial governments achieve their poverty reduction targets. All provinces and territories now have their own poverty reduction strategies; many of these strategies include targets pertaining to reducing the number of people under the poverty line (New Brunswick’s strategy actually seeks to reduce deep income poverty by 50%). Increasing social assistance benefit levels would help all provinces and territories achieve their targets.

6. More than half of people in Canada who are in ‘deep income poverty’ are singles. Not only do singles receive very low social assistance benefit levels relative to other household types, but they also do not realize many of the economies of scale that come with cohabitating (e.g., shared rent, shared utility costs, etc.). This reality makes this household group all the more worthy of policy attention.

7. Higher social assistance benefit levels can result in less homelessness. It’s intuitive for many of us that higher social assistance benefit levels would both reduce the likelihood of a person losing their housing and also increase the likelihood of a person experiencing homelessness to obtain rental housing on the private market. Research by Ron Kneebone and Margarita Wilkins confirms this, estimating that a $1,500/yr. increase in social assistance benefits for an employable single without dependants would (in 2011) reduce the use of shelter beds on any given night by nearly 20%.

8. Higher benefit levels can improve food security. A recent study in British Columbia confirms this, finding that overall rates of food security improved among social assistance recipients after a one-time increase in social assistance benefit levels in that province. 

9. Less homelessness and improved food security would almost certainly result in public cost savings. The costs of homelessness to the taxpayer are well documented, as are the healthcare costs associated with food insecurity. Put differently, increasing public expenditure on social assistance would likely result in public savings elsewhere.

10. While higher benefit levels would likely lead to more takeup, this increased takeup would be modest. That is precisely the finding of a recent Canadian study that I co-authored with Ali Jadidzadeh. We found that a 10% increase in the real value of social assistance benefit levels for this same household group would likely result in an increase in caseloads of less than 5%.

In sum. When it comes to social assistance across Canada, employable single adults without dependants are a very neglected subgroup. Increasing their benefit levels would likely result in less poverty, improved food security and less homelessness.

 

I wish to thank Susan Falvo, Lynn McIntyre, Vincent St-Martin and Val Tarasuk for assistance with this blog post.

Social assistance: Do higher benefit levels lead to higher caseloads?

Social assistance: Do higher benefit levels lead to higher caseloads?

by | Oct 10, 2020 | British Columbia, Canada, Data Sharing, Determinants of Homelessness, Ending Homelessness, Fiscal policy, Government, Government Funding, Health Care, Homeless, Income, Income Distribution, Income Inequality, Income Support, Labour Market, Policy, Poverty, Poverty Reduction, Research and Data, Social Assistance, Social Policy

Social assistance: Do higher benefit levels lead to higher caseloads?

I’ve recently co-authored a journal article[1] with Ali Jadidzadeh that asks the question: Do higher social assistance benefit levels lead to greater take-up? The short answer is yes, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t increase benefit levels.

Here are 11 things to know about the study.

1. The study looks only at employable adult singles without dependants. Other studies asking the same question have looked at other household groups; but ours focuses on single adults without dependants in part because this group receives very little public policy attention, and in part because they comprise most persons experiencing absolute homelessness in Canada.

2. While the study measures the impact of a variety of independent variables on caseloads, the one we were most interested in was benefit levels. Other independent variables considered in the study are: the official unemployment rate; ‘working poor’ income (e.g., third and fourth decile income); population variation over time; and social assistance rule changes.

3. The study uses three alternative models to estimate the impact of these variables. Essentially, different measurement techniques have their strengths and weaknesses, so it’s common for statistical work like this to use a variety of approaches so that the reader can compare findings.

4. The first model finds an important relationship between benefit levels and caseload growth. Specifically, it finds that a 1% increase in the real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) value of benefit levels results in a 0.372% increase in caseloads. This model uses pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), an approach that doesn’t account for provincial fixed effects (i.e., characteristics of provinces that don’t vary over time). These results should therefore be taken less seriously than the other two models.

5. The second model finds a rather modest relationship between increases in benefit levels and caseload growth. Specifically, it finds that a 1% increase in the real value of benefit levels results in just a 0.157% increase in caseloads. This approach uses fixed effects OLS, meaning it accounts for unobservable provincial characteristics.

6. The third model finds the relationship to be a bit stronger. This approach uses Panel Fully Modified OLS and finds a 1% increase in the real value of benefit levels to result in a 0.457% increase in caseloads. This approach is considered good when researchers want to study long-run relationships between continuous (i.e., quantifiable) variables. It’s a relatively new approach that has gained currency in the past five years.

7. There’s an important takeaway from this. Specifically, a 10% increase in the real value of social assistance benefit levels would likely result in caseload growth for this group of between 1.57% and 4.57%. Many observers would consider this to be modest caseload growth.

8. Rule changes are important, but they are difficult to measure. In the mid-1990s, several large provinces introduced strict eligibility criteria (including the introduction of work-for-welfare provisions). The study finds their impact in reducing caseloads to be statistically significant. However, in general, it is very challenging for statistical analysis to measure the impact of rule changes on caseloads.

9. The unemployment rate has a modest impact on caseloads. In the first model, a one percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate is found to be associated with a 7.3% drop in caseloads (in the second model, it’s associated with a 5.8% drop). One implication from this is that provincial and territorial officials should not expect job creation alone to wipe out social assistance caseloads for employable singles.

10. The study cautions policymakers against focusing too much on the sizes of caseloads. In other words, when deciding on the appropriate levels of benefits, the study encourages policymakers to consider positive outcomes associated with higher benefit levels.

11. Higher social assistance benefit levels can help accomplish other policy objectives. As the study points out, they can reduce the percentage of Canadians living in poverty, reduce levels of food insecurity, improve health outcomes and reduce homelessness (all of which can result in savings of their own to the taxpayer). So if higher benefit levels also result in modest caseload growth, that may not be so bad. 

In sum. There are many positive outcomes associated with higher social assistance benefit levels. Having said that, when policymakers decide to increase benefit levels, they should budget for some increased take-up.

I wish to thank the following individuals for assistance with this blog post: Susan Falvo, Ali Jadidzadeh, Richard Shillington and Vincent St-Martin.

[1] For a full copy of the article, please email me at falvo.nicholas@gmail.com.

Social assistance: Do higher benefit levels lead to higher caseloads?

Ten things to know about poverty measurement in Canada

by | Oct 30, 2019 | Canada, Cities, Government, Housing, Income, Income Distribution, Income Inequality, Income Support, Labour Market, Macroeconomics, municipalities, population aging, Poverty, Poverty Reduction, Research and Data, seniors, Social Assistance, Social Housing, Social Policy, Stats Canada

Ten things to know about poverty measurement in Canada

On October 29, I gave a guest presentation to Professor Filipe Duarte’s master’s seminar class at the University of Windsor. The topic of my presentation was poverty measurement in Canada.

Here are 10 things to know.

  1. Use of the Low-Income Cut-Off (LICO) would suggest that poverty in Canada has decreased dramatically since the mid-1990s. LICO focuses on the amount of money spent by a family on ‘necessities’ (i.e., housing, food and clothing) as determined by a group of federal public servants. If a family is spending a substantially higher percentage of their income on such necessities—e.g., 20 percentage points higher than the average Canadian family—then the family in question falls below the LICO. The LICO was supposed to be recalculated on a regular basis to reflect changes in spending patterns, but that hasn’t happened since 1992 and is one likely reason for the reduction in poverty shown by this measure (having said that, the LICO has been adjusted each year for inflation). Today, very few experts take the LICO seriously.
  2. Use of the Low Income Measure (LIM) would suggest that poverty in Canada has seen mild fluctuations since the mid-1990s. LIM’s focus is on the family’s income, not on what they spend. A family whose income is below 50% of the national median income (adjusted for family size) is said to be poor according to this measure. LIM, in effect, measures income inequality among the bottom half of income earners. The LIM is useful for international comparisons (though it is far from perfect in that regard, as it looks only at income, not the availability of social programs). 
  3. Use of the Market Basket Measure (MBM) suggests that Canada has seen a major decrease in poverty over the past decade. With the MBM, public officials figure out the cost of a basket of goods and services they feel is sufficient for a standard of living “between the poles of subsistence and social inclusion.” Calculations are then made about how much such a basket costs (the cost of this basket has been estimated for 50 regions across Canada). The content of this basket is periodically adjusted, the last time being in 2011, and its value gets adjusted each year for inflation. If you’re poor according to the MBM, it’s because experts believe you could not afford that basket of goods in your community.

    Visual courtesy of Kevin Milligan.

  4. One of the LICO’s shortcomings is that it doesn’t do a good job of accounting for regional variations in the cost of living across Canada. The LICO (as mentioned above) also hasn’t been adjusted since 1992, meaning that it doesn’t currently account for how much things cost today or what people spend money on today (as Andrew Jackson notes, it doesn’t include the cost of Internet). Finally, LICO doesn’t easily allow for international comparisons. 
  5. One of the LIM’s shortcomings is that it can suggest that recessions are good for poverty reduction. As Alain Noël notes, the LIM is “sensitive to changes in the median income, which sometimes produces counterintuitive results. In a recession, for example, when the median income is flat, the poverty rate may seem to be decreasing while unemployment and economic hardship are increasing.” What’s more, the fact that LIM is based on national median income—as opposed to the median income for the province or territory in question—seems arbitrary to many. Indeed, Professor Noël further notes that “real median incomes vary considerably from one province to another.”
  6. Of the three major indicators, my own preference is the LIM. First, it avoids the inherent challenge of deciding what constitutes an appropriate a basket of goods and services in a country of 37 million people, spanning 10 million km2 and six time zones. Second, I think relativity is what’s really important here—if median income across Canada is increasing, then so too should everyone’s (and vice versa). Third, the LIM lends itself well to international comparisons. I’d like to see it calculated based on national median income for international comparisons, and also based on median income for the economic region in question, in order to provide a more meaningful number.
  7. The debate within Canada has largely ignored the need for indicators of assets. This point has been made by David Rothwell and Jennifer Robson, who note that income and assets are not always correlated. For example, a low-wage worker might have an income that brings them above the LIM, but they may also have $75,000 in student loans and credit card debt. Conversely, a senior could be relying exclusively on Old Age Security as a source of income while also owning a $2 million home outright. (Monitoring asset poverty might put pressure on provincial and territorial officials to stop discouraging asset accumulation among social assistance recipients.)
  8. It’s also important to directly measure material deprivation. For example, core housing need measures the affordability, suitability and adequacy of a person’s housing. Likewise, food insecurity measurement directly assesses the inadequacy or insecurity in access to food due to financial challenges. It’s also important to assess who has access to high-quality childcare and prescription medication. (For a critical analysis of the need to directly measure material deprivation, see this 2017 conference paper.)
  9. In August 2018, Canada’s federal government announced its formal adoption of the MBM as its official poverty measure. Its poverty reduction strategy also unveiled a dashboard of poverty-related indicators. This seems very much in line with a position taken by Peter Hicks in a recent blog post, in which he calls for “an evolving ‘dashboard’ of carefully selected indicators would be more useful than a single measure.” The new federal strategy will use the MBM to monitor progress—importantly, it will not use the MBM to determine program eligibility.
  10. Seniors make for an interesting case study here. According to the LIM, a great many seniors in Canada currently experience poverty. But according to the MBM, very few seniors in Canada currently experience poverty. As Andrew Jackson pointed out last year: “There is a huge difference between the LIM and MBM poverty rates for seniors (14.3% vs 5.1% in 2015.)” And this raises an important question: if Canada’s official poverty measure suggests there’s very little seniors’ poverty, to what extent will Canada’s federal government prioritize assistance for seniors?

In sum. The Trudeau government deserves praise for unveiling a dashboard of poverty indicators that will hopefully receive close attention from federal officials in partnership with provincial, territorial and municipal officials, as well as researchers and advocates. Having said that, Ron Kneebone reminds me that the MBM has yet to be formally adopted by provincial or territorial governments. There is also reason to be very concerned about what initiatives may or not be in store for seniors, given that the MBM suggests they currently experience very little poverty.

 

I wish to thank the following individuals for assistance with this blog post: Miles Corak, Filipe Duarte and his students, Susan Falvo, Reuben Ford, Rob Gillezeau, Seth Klein, Ron Kneebone, Andrew Jackson, Marc Lee, David Macdonald, Michael Mendelson, Allan Moscovitch, Geranda Notten, Charles Plante, Saul Schwartz, Richard Shillington, Vincent St-Martin, John Stapleton, Ricardo Tranjan, and Mike Veall. Any errors are mine.